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COMBATING THE COLOR-CODED CONFINEMENT OF
KIDS: AN EQUAL PROTECTION REMEDY
PERRY L. MORIEARTY*
"I'm not going home today, am I? " Jason says matter-of-factly, peering
through the book-sized opening of the holding cell door. Five other boys in
handcuffs and leg shackles sit on a bench behind him. Jason is terse and almost
expressionless, the product, his lawyer later realizes, of a bleak childhood that
began when he was removed from his drug-addicted mother as a baby and shuf-
fled in and out of ten foster homes over the course of the next fifteen years.
While he has been part of the child welfare system his entire life, Jason has
only recently become involved with its punitive cousin-the juvenile justice sys-
tem. His underlying charge, a trespass, wasn't serious, but he was detained at
arraignment, and things went quickly downhill from there. During his two
weeks in detention, Jason was cited twice for fighting and three times for ob-
structive behavior. "Defiant and uncooperative, " he was labeled on his habeas
transfer sheet.
Now Jason is back in court, ostensibly for his pre-trial conference, but in
reality because state law won't allow the juvenile court to detain him for more
than fifteen days without an appearance. His lawyer, who met Jason only an
hour earlier, approaches the probation officer covering his case. "Unless he
wants to plead out today, I'm going to recommend another fourteen days," the
officer says, looking up from Jason's transfer sheet. "But it's a trespass-" his
lawyer begins to argue when the probation officer interrupts him. "And it says
here that he 's not cooperating in the foster home either. If he 's getting out, I
want him supervised. "
Bending to meet Jason's eyes through the holding cell door, Jason 's lawyer
relays his conversation with the probation officer. "So I'm not getting out today
if I don't take a deal, "Jason says resignedly. "The judge could ignore proba-
tion's recommendation," his lawyer offers, "but there 's no guarantee." Jason
pauses. "Then I'll take the deal."
It feels like a set-up, Jason 's lawyer thinks to himself as he watches Jason
retreat to the holding cell bench. 1
* Associate Professor of Clinical Instruction, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grateful
to Professors Alan Chen, Barry Feld, and Scott Moriearty for their insightful comments on drafts
of this paper and to Kyle Hofmann for his encouragement. I would also like to thank University of
Denver Faculty Services Liaison Diane Burkhardt for her research support and the editors at the
Review of Law and Social Change for making this article a whole lot better. Any errors are mine.
1. This narrative, which will be woven throughout the remainder of this paper, is loosely
based on the experience of a client represented by Suffolk University Law School's Juvenile Jus-
tice Center in proceedings before Massachusetts juvenile court. While the narrative captures the
essence of "Jason's" experience with the Massachusetts juvenile justice system, many of the events
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The juvenile justice system was created more than a century ago to assist,
rather than punish, children like Jason. A product of the emerging twentieth-
century concept of childhood as a period of innocence and malleability, 2 the sys-
tem was founded on the premise that delinquent acts by children were not born
of malevolence, but rather were a product of antecedent forces largely beyond
their control.3 The juvenile justice system was therefore to stand apart from the
criminal justice system both substantively and procedurally. 4 "The child was to
be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated,"' the Supreme Court would later reflect, "and the
'procedures,' from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be 'clini-
cal' rather than punitive." 5 Criminal jurisprudence was eschewed in favor of
procedural informality and nearly unfettered discretion, which, reformers be-
lieved, would best enable courts to diagnose and fashion an individualized cure
for each child's delinquent behavior.
6
Over the last half century, the system inspired by these lofty and largely be-
nevolent ideals has given way to one that is increasingly punitive and adversar-
ial. The so-called "Due Process Revolution" of the 1960s led to the implementa-
tion of various constitutional safeguards that had the unintended effect of
transforming juvenile court proceedings from informal, administrative hearings
into full-blown prosecutions. 7 "Tough on crime" legislators would subsequently
described have been altered to protect the identities of the participants and the confidentiality of
the proceedings in question. In the author's experience, however, Jason's encounter with the juve-
nile justice system is typical of court-involved youth throughout the country.
2. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691,
691-94 (1991) (citing LAWRENCE CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM
IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 1876-1957, at 127-28 (1961), and JOSEPH F. KETTS, RITES OF PASSAGE:
ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE PRESENT (1977)) (noting that the emerging perception of
children "as vulnerable, innocent, passive, and dependent beings who needed extended preparation
for life" at the turn of the century reflected a shift from the pre-industrial view of children as
miniature adults); SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 14-33 (1982); WALTER I. TRATrNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 45-47 (1970);
ROBERT WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920, at 11-75 (1967).
3. See, e.g., ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT
27-30 (1978) (explaining that the Progressives saw children as pure but malleable); Barry C. Feld,
The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It
Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 832-33 (1988) (arguing that the penal goals of treatment and punish-
ment are fundamentally distinct and based on "markedly different assumptions about the sources
of criminal or delinquent behavior").
4. "The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that
children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals," the
Supreme Court noted in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967). "They believed that society's role was
not to ascertain whether the child was 'guilty' or 'innocent,' but 'What is he, how has he become
what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him
from a downward career."' Id. (citing Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104,
119-20 (1909)).
5. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
6. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, supra note 2, at 695.
7. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility,
and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 73 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme
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rely on the enhanced procedural protections extended to juveniles by the Su-
preme Court as a basis for enacting laws that dramatically expanded the punitive
options available to courts.8 In many respects, these changes have morphed the
juvenile court into a quasi-criminal hybrid that bears little resemblance to its re-
habilitative forebear.
Nonetheless, the juvenile justice system has not shed all the vestiges of its
past. While the Supreme Court has required juvenile courts to adopt many of the
procedural safeguards of criminal proceedings, it has expressly declined to ex-
tend to juveniles the full panoply of constitutional rights afforded adults.9
Unlike adult defendants, juvenile defendants have no constitutional right to a
trial by jury, 10 may be preventively detained prior to trial irrespective of the se-
verity of the underlying offense,11 and are, for the most part, charged, adjudi-
cated, and sentenced in proceedings that are closed to the general public. 12
While the countervailing rationales of flexibility and informality may indeed be
compelling, the reality is that juvenile defendants are not entitled to three of the
criminal justice system's most fundamental checks against institutional bias.
Compounding this procedural austerity is the fact that most juvenile courts have
retained some semblance of their original "future welfare" ideology, which nec-
essarily requires decision-makers to assess not only the elements of the child's
offense, but also the attributes of the child herself.13 As a result, juvenile court
processing decisions are often less the product of legal factors, such as the sever-
ity of the alleged offense, than they are of "social factors," 14 such as the relative
stability of the child's family. 15 Because these social factors often represent
Court decisions mandating the juvenile court's adoption of procedural safeguards "unintentionally,
but inevitably, transformed the juvenile court system from its original Progressive conception as a
social welfare agency into a wholly-owned subsidiary of the criminal justice system").
8. See, e.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE &
FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 102-08
(1999) (discussing legislation enacted during the last thirty years emphasizing proportionality and
determinate sentencing).
9. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971), for example, Justice Blackmun
cited the Court's historic reticence to issue "a flat holding that all rights constitutionally assured for
the adult accused are to be imposed upon the state juvenile proceeding" as a basis for finding that
juveniles were not constitutionally entitled to a trial by jury.
10. Id.
11. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-74 (1984).
12. SNYDER & SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999, supra note 8, at 94-95
(noting that juvenile proceedings are "quasi-civil" and "may be confidential," while criminal pro-
ceedings are "open" and accessible to the public).
13. See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
67 (1999) (noting that, from the beginning, "juvenile court judges directed their attention first and
foremost to the 'whole' child rather than to the specific crime").
14. For purposes of this article, the term "social factors" is used to describe statutorily pre-
scribed criteria that are extrinsic to the child's alleged offense but are a part of the socio-economic
and socio-familial milieu in which the child lives.
15. While social factors plainly also play a role in criminal court decision-making, their role
is, by virtue of the adult justice system's retribution-based ideology, subordinate to the role of
relevant legal factors. See Allan Horwitz & Michael Wasserman, Formal Rationality, Substantive
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socio-economic and socio-familial status variables that are inherently susceptible
to speculation and normative interpretation, outcomes sometimes bear little rela-
tion to the underlying offense. 16 The net result is a modem-day juvenile court
that metes out all the punishment, with little of the regularity, accountability, or
visibility, of its adult counterpart-a combination that many believe allots juve-
nile defendants the "worst of both worlds."
17
Evidence suggests that this dichotomy has particularly dire consequences
for juveniles like Jason. Jason is a juvenile of color. 18 For decades, studies have
shown that youth of color are more likely to be arrested, detained, formally
charged in juvenile court, transferred to adult court, and confined to secure resi-
dential facilities than their white counterparts. 19 While there is some evidence
Justice, and Discrimination: A Study of a Juvenile Court, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 103, 103-05
(1980) (finding that juvenile courts are more likely to consider social rather than formal legal crite-
ria when making dispositional decisions).
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. The use of the phrase "worst of both worlds" in the juvenile justice context was coined by
Justice Fortas in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). Weighing whether the laudable
purpose of the juvenile court justified what evidence suggested was a pattern of "procedural arbi-
trariness" and inadequate performance, Justice Fortas lamented, "There is evidence, in fact, that
there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postu-
lated for children." Id. This dichotomy has led several commentators to call for the abolition of
the juvenile court altogether. See, e.g., Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 7; Janet E.
Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing
the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991); Stephen Wizner & Mary F. Keller, The Penal
Model of Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency Jurisdiction Obsolete?, 52 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1120 (1977).
18. For purposes of this paper, the terms "children of color" and "minority youth" are defined
according to their definitions under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974
(JJDPA), Pub. L. No. 102-586, § 2(f)(3)(A)(ii), 106 Stat. 4982, 4993-94 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 5633 (Supp. III 2005)), as African American, Native American, Latino, Pacific Is-
lander, and Asian American. 28 C.F.R. § 31.303(j)(6) (2006).
19. See, e.g., NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME:
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF MINORITY YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2007) (finding that,
from 2002 to 2004, African Americans comprised 16% of all youth, 28% of juvenile arrests, 30%
of referrals to juvenile court, 37% of the detained population, 34% of youth formally processed by
the juvenile court, 30% of adjudicated youth, 35% of youth judicially waived to criminal court,
38% of youth in residential placement, and 58% of youth admitted to state adult prison); EILEEN
POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME:
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF MINORITY YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2000) (from 1997 to
1998, African Americans comprised 15% of all youth, 26% of juvenile arrests, 31% of referrals to
juvenile court, 44% of the detained population, 34% of youth formally processed by the juvenile
court, 32% of adjudicated youth, 46% of youth judicially waived to criminal court, 40% of youth
in residential placement, and 58% of youth admitted to state adult prison); Carl E. Pope & William
Feyerherm, Minority Status and Juvenile Justice Processing: An Assessment of the Research Lit-
erature, 22 CRIM. JUST. ABSTRACTS 327, 527-42 (1990) [hereinafter DMC: 1969-1989 Review of
Research] (finding that two-thirds of the studies of state and local juvenile justice systems reported
a "race effect," defined as a statistically significant race relationship with case outcome, at some
stage of the juvenile justice process that negatively affected outcomes for youth of color); CARL E.
POPE, RICK LOVELL & HEIDI M. HSIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY
CONFINEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE FROM 1989 THROUGH 2001 (2002) [here-
inafter DMC: 1989-2001 REVIEW OF LITERATURE] (finding that twenty-five of thirty-four studies
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that marginally differential offending patterns may contribute to this phenome-
non, 20 differences in primary behavior simply cannot account for the significant
disparities observed at any of the processing points in the juvenile justice sys-
tem. 2 1 Something is happening inside the system itself.
Over the last thirty years, a number of increasingly sophisticated analyses
have documented a statistically significant "race effect" on juvenile justice out-
comes.2 2 It was the early versions of these studies that prompted Congress to
make the issue of "minority overrepresentation" 23 a legislative priority twenty
years ago. Congress's 1988 amendments to the Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention Act (JJDPA) required individual states to investigate whether
children of color were overrepresented in their secure confinement facilities and,
if so, to develop action plans to reduce such overrepresentation. 24 The so-called
"DMC Mandate"25 became a "core requirement" of the JJDPA in 1992,26 and, a
reviewed reported "race effects" in the processing of youth).
20. See, e.g., Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Prac-
tice: Persistence, Seriousness and Race, 14 LAW & INEQ. 73, 104-05 (1995) (citing sources sug-
gesting that minority youth are disproportionately involved in violent criminal activities).
21. See ELEANOR HINTON HoYTT, VINCENT SCHIRALDI, BRENDA V. SMITH & JASON
ZIEDENBERG, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN JUVENILE DETENTION 20-
21 figs.6-7 (2002) (noting that African American youth are arrested at double the rate of white
youth for drug offenses and more than twice the rate of white youth for weapons offenses, even
though white youth report substantially higher levels of drug use and commission of weapons
crimes); LLOYD D. JOHNSON, PATRICK M. O'MALLEY & JOHN E. SCHULENBERG, NAT'L INST. ON
DRUG ABUSE, MONITORING THE FUTURE, NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975-2006,
SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS 32 (2007) ("African-American 12th graders have consistently
shown lower usage rates than White 12th graders for most drugs, both licit and illicit.").
22. See, e.g., Michael J. Leiber, Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) of Youth: An
Analysis of State and Federal Efforts to Address the Issue, 48 CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 11-14 (2002)
(finding that thirty-two of forty-six studies conducted by forty different states reported "race ef-
fects," defined as "the presence of a statistically significant race relationship with a case outcome
that remains once controls for legal factors have been considered"); DMC: 1989-2001 REVIEW OF
LITERATURE, supra note 19, at 5 (finding that twenty-five of thirty-four studies reviewed reported
"race effects" in the processing of youth); DMC: 1969-1989 Review of Research, supra note 19, at
327-35, 527-42 (finding that two-thirds of the studies of state and local juvenile justice systems
reported a "race effect" at some stage of the juvenile justice process that negatively affected out-
comes for youth of color).
23. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), the federal agency
established to administer the JJDPA, defines "overrepresentation" as "a situation in which a larger
proportion of a particular group is present at various stages within the juvenile justice system (such
as intake, detention, adjudication, and disposition) than would be expected based on its proportion
in the general population." See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:
2006 NATIONAL REPORT 189-90 (2006). As discussed in Part II, infra, OJJDP has recently ac-
knowledged the flaw of relying on general population statistics to calculate proportional disparities
and now calculates disparities by looking at the relevant sub-populations of young people, both by
race and geography.
24. Pub. L. 100-690, § 7258(c), 102 Stat. 4181, 4439-40 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
5633(a)(22) (Supp. IV 2004)).
25. The acronym "DMC" originally referred to "Disproportionate Minority Confinement,"
which occurs when the percentage of minority youth confined in juvenile justice system facilities
exceeds their proportion in the general population. See Pub. L. 100-690, § 7258, 102 Stat. 4439-
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decade later, it was expanded to encompass not only confinement, but every
processing point within the juvenile justice system.27
But despite nearly two decades of federally mandated attention to the prob-
lem, the results have been mixed at best. While some states have implemented
comprehensive strategies to reduce overrepresentation in their juvenile justice
systems, others have not taken even the most rudimentary steps toward identify-
ing the scope of the problem. 28 And although a few states have made progress,
disparities nationwide have either increased or remained stagnant.29 The limited
success of the DMC Mandate has been attributed to everything from the vague-
ness of the statute itself, to lax oversight by the federal Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, to technical incompetence and bureaucratic intran-
sigence at the state level. 30 It has also been attributed more generally to the in-
herent limitations of relying on a political process to alleviate institutional race
bias. 31
To date, however, the quintessential apolitical branch, the judiciary, has
played little if any role in addressing the presence of DMC in the juvenile justice
system. This article considers the feasibility of such intervention. Part I dis-
cusses the history of the juvenile justice system; describes the various judicial,
legislative, and administrative changes that have transformed the system from a
social welfare agency into a quasi-criminal hybrid; and illustrates the nature of
40 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (Supp. IV 2004)). In 2002, Congress ex-
panded the concept of DMC to include any point of "contact" with the juvenile justice system at
which minority youth are overrepresented. See Pub. L. 107-273, § 12209(1)(P), 116 Stat. 1873,
1878 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (Supp. IV 2004)). The acronym "DMC"
now commonly refers to "Disproportionate Minority Contact."
26. Pub. L. No. 102-586, § 2(f)(3)(A)(ii), 106 Stat. 4982, 4993-94 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (Supp. IV 2004)).
27. Pub. L. 107-273, § 12209(1)(P), 116 Stat. 1873, 1878 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5633(a)(22) (Supp. IV 2004)).
28. See, e.g., Leiber, supra note 22, at 15; HEIDI M. HSIA, GEORGE S. BRIDGES & ROSALIE
MCHALE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT 2002 UPDATE 10-11
(2004) [hereinafter DMC 2002 UPDATE] (confirming that, as of 2002, several states had not com-
plied with even the most basic requirements of the Mandate); ROBIN DAHLBERG, AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS: FAILURES IN
ASSESSING AND ADDRESSING THE OVERREPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES IN THE MASSACHUSETTS
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1-2 (2003) (discussing Massachusetts' continued failure to comply with
the DMC Mandate).
29. SNYDER & SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006, supra note 23, at 163,
169. This is discussed in detail in Part II, infra.
30. See, e.g., Leiber, supra note 22, at 14-19. See generally DAHLBERG, supra note 28.
31. Leiber, supra note 22, at 14-19 (positing that the states' ability to "fully comply" with the
DMC Mandate is "influenced by politics and the complexity of the issue"). See generally DAVID
COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE, RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 139
(1999) (arguing that the legislative process cannot be counted on to protect the interests of minori-
ties and accused criminals); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980) (positing that prejudice can distort the political process by barring minorities from
the "pluralists' bazaar" and by causing lawmakers to misapprehend the costs and benefits of their
actions).
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juvenile justice decision-making through an analysis of each of the five stages of
the juvenile court process. Part II examines one of the system's most pervasive
problems-the phenomenon of Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC). It
posits that, irrespective of the historically benevolent justifications for the juve-
nile justice system's make-up, the lack of important procedural safeguards, the
often arbitrary nature of juvenile justice practices and decision-making, and the
frequency with which administrators base processing decisions on social factors
with strong racial correlates make it a particularly likely host to discrimination.
Part III then discusses the relative ineffectiveness of the legislation enacted to
reduce minority overrepresentation in the juvenile justice system.
Finally, Part IV considers the gains which might be achieved by an effort to
reform the system through an equal protection challenge to the disproportionate
pretrial detention of minority youth in the juvenile justice system. This paper
focuses on the "pretrial detention" stage of juvenile justice processing for several
reasons. First, as discussed in Part I, there is no single "juvenile justice system"
in the United States. Juvenile justice processing varies widely from state to
state, and even from community to community. 32 As a result, any analysis of
juvenile justice "processing" as a whole necessarily contains so many caveats as
to be virtually meaningless. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, it makes
sense to focus on a single processing point and to confine the analysis further to
data from a handful of states. Second, as discussed in detail in Part IV, of the six
primary decision points in the juvenile justice system-arrest, intake, detention,
waiver to adult court, adjudication, and disposition-the nature of the detention
decision makes it most susceptible to an equal protection challenge. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the detention decision is viewed by many as the most
critical processing decision made by juvenile justice professionals. From a legal
perspective, research indicates that whether or not a juvenile is detained at ar-
raignment plays a significant role in determining whether she will be committed
at disposition. 3 3 And, from a psychological perspective, because youth are often
housed in unsafe and overcrowded facilities with sub-par medical, mental health,
educational, and recreational resources, secure detention-however temporary-
is believed to have a profoundly negative impact on detainees.
34
Any such challenge would have to be predicated on a sophisticated statisti-
cal analysis showing not just that minorities fare worse than their white com-
parators in the juvenile justice system, but that these disparities are due to statis-
tically significant differences in the treatment of otherwise similarly situated
white youth and youth of color.35 Based on the number of studies showing not
32. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006, supra note 23, at
104.
33. See ELIZABETH CALVIN, NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., LEGAL STRATEGIES TO REDUCE
THE UNNECESSARY DETENTION OF CHILDREN 56 (2004).
34. See generally SUE BURRELL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., IMPROVING CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT IN SECURE JUVENILE DETENTION CENTERS (1999).
35. The Supreme Court spelled out this requirement in the employment context when it held
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just that youth of color are overrepresented but that a statistically significant race
effect underlies disadvantageous outcomes for children of color in juvenile jus-
tice systems throughout the country, this paper assumes that such a showing can
be made. Even then, however, litigants face a second legal hurdle: the rigorous
standard of proof of discriminatory intent first promulgated by the Supreme
Court in Washington v. Davis36 and applied to criminal justice decision-making
a decade later in McCleskey v. Kemp,37 a standard many believe has spawned a
modem equal protection jurisprudence that is effectively impervious to claims of
institutional discrimination in the criminal justice system.38
This paper argues that McCleskey should not deter juvenile claimants. First,
by the McCleskey Court's own reasoning, the nature of the pretrial detention de-
cision places it squarely within the contours of the types of administrative deci-
sions for which the Court has accepted statistical evidence of race bias to create
an inference of discriminatory intent. Specifically, because pretrial detention
decisions are generally made by repeat actors, who are increasingly required to
base their decisions on statutorily prescribed, uniform criteria and who can be
called upon to rebut statistical evidence of race bias, they can be distinguished
from the capital sentencing decision at issue in McCleskey and analogized to
those administrative decisions to which the Court has historically applied the less
onerous, burden-shifting framework set forth a decade earlier in Castaneda v.
Partida.39 Second, an equal protection challenge to the disproportionate pretrial
detention of minority youth in the juvenile justice system is less likely to run
afoul of the primary pragmatic concern articulated by the McCleskey majority-
the proverbial slippery slope. As an initial matter, as Justice Powell himself
pointed out in McCleskey, the three features of the pretrial detention decision
that render it susceptible to a statistical inference of discrimination are relatively
unique. There are simply not that many administrative decisions that have the
Castaneda characteristics. Moreover, that the juvenile justice system remains an
that statistical analyses of racial disparities in hiring must be based on the relevant subsection of
qualified candidates in the local labor market. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
650-51 (1989).
36. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
37. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
38. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 31, at 132-41 (arguing that the Court's formulation of the
"intent" standard is nearly impossible for criminal defendants to meet, since they are all but barred
from obtaining the type of evidence necessary to make the requisite showing); Reva Siegel, Why
Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49
STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1136-37 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court's formulation of discrimina-
tory intent "is one that the sociological and psychological studies of racial bias suggest plaintiffs
will rarely be able to prove"); Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment,
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1388, 1419-20 (1988) (discussing how the purposeful
discrimination requirement "ignores the chameleon-like ability of prejudice to adapt unobtrusively
to new surroundings"); Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (proposing a cultural-meaning test to account
for unconscious discrimination in the administration of law).
39. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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autonomous entity, which is governed by independent legislation, is adminis-
tered by independent agencies, and continues to be guided, at least in part, by a
welfare-oriented ideology distinct from its criminal counterpart, would give
courts a defensible basis for cabining the precedential utility of a successful
claim40 _a factor that plainly influenced the outcomes of both Washington v.
Davis and McCleskey.
The remedial value of a successful equal protection challenge is plain. Be-
yond the obvious benefits to the individual petitioner, a successful equal protec-
tion challenge to the disproportionate pretrial detention of children of color has
the potential to act as a catalyst for the systemic reform and accountability that,
in many jurisdictions, simply have not materialized through legislation. It also
has the potential to enforce a norm of racial justice in the juvenile justice system
that courts are plainly reluctant to enforce in the adult justice system. In doing
so, the juvenile bench would take an important step, albeit incremental, toward
legitimizing itself as a guarantor of equality under the law and an adherent to its
historical normative commitments-a measure that is essential to a court whose
very success depends on its constituents' willingness to participate in its proc-
esses.
4 1
I.
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. History of the Juvenile Court
On November 18, 2002, at approximately 8:00 p.m., police officers de-
scended on a house near Boston with a warrant to arrest two men they believed
were trafficking cocaine out of a second-floor apartment. Instead, they found
two fifteen-year-old boys sitting on the front steps. Though the boys repeatedly
denied that they were there to buy drugs, they were arrested for trespassing.
"I've seen that kid around," one of the officers quipped, gesturing toward
Jason in the backseat of the cruiser. "You're spending a lot of time in Roxbury
for a kid who lives in Mattapan," he yelled over his shoulder as they drove to-
ward the Area D-4 Precinct. Jason looked out the window.
40. This is not to suggest that a successful equal protection challenge to DMC in the juvenile
justice system could not serve as precedent for a comparable challenge in the criminal justice sys-
tem, but simply that the procedural, ideological, and administrative differences between the two
systems would give courts a defensible basis for resisting a broader application.
41. Sociological studies have found a litigant's perceptions of procedural justice to have a
significant impact on her overall satisfaction with the justice system irrespective of the substantive
outcome of her individual case. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 61-92 (1988); Jonathan D. Casper, Tom Tyler & Bonnie
Fisher, Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 483, 483 (1988); Tom R. Tyler,
What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Proce-
dures, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 103 (1988).
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With Jason handcuffed to a chair near his desk, the officer contacted the on-
duty juvenile probation officer for Suffolk County. "Hold him, or send him
home?" the officer asked. "You're in luck," the officer announced, hanging up
the phone. "Ifyour mom will come get you, you can go home."
Two hours later, Jason was in the Sheriff's van on his way to the Area A-]
Precinct. His foster mother couldn't come get him, she had told the police offi-
cer when he called. And even if she could, she added, she wasn't so sure she
wanted Jason back in her home. Jason spent the night of November 18th on a
bare cot in a locked cell in downtown Boston.
The nation's first juvenile court was established in Cook County, Illinois, in
1899. Prompted by the prevailing Progressive philosophy that children should
be treated as vulnerable and dependent beings in need of special care and protec-
tion, the juvenile justice system was created as a social welfare alternative to the
criminal justice system.42  The system was designed to "take [each child] in
charge, not so much to punish as to reform, not to degrade but uplift, not to crush
but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen." 43 The juvenile
court collapsed the distinction between civil and criminal charges, deeming all
violations civil infractions, and replaced lawyers and juries with social service
personnel, probation officers, and clinicians. 44  Courtroom vocabulary shifted
accordingly: "crimes" became "delinquent behavior," juveniles were "adjudi-
cated" not "convicted," and judges gave "dispositions" rather than "sentences. '" 45
Formal rules of evidence and procedure were abandoned in favor of broad
judicial discretionary powers. 46  Maximum flexibility and informality, it was
thought, would best enable the states to carry out their role as parens patriae.
47
42. See Mary E. Spring, Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution: A New Approach to the
Problem of Delinquency in Illinois, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1351, 1354-55 (1998) (observing
that, where "Colonial America embraced an uncomplicated view of juvenile justice" which often
included the public whipping, dunking, and banishing of incorrigible children, the Industrial Revo-
lution forced society to rethink its approach to delinquency); C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and
the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV.
659, 662-65 (2005) (observing that the Progressives' approach to juvenile delinquency represented
a departure from the Colonial belief that parents and educators "were free to use whatever means
they deemed appropriate to correct misbehaving children").
43. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 107 (1909).
44. See Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Con-
servative "Backlash," 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1453-59 (2003).
45. See Clarke, supra note 42, at 667 n.34 (citing DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN § 21.01 (2d ed. 1994)).
46. See Clarke, supra note 42, at 668 (noting that "courts were given maximum discretion to
allow for flexibility in diagnosis and treatment" and citing FREDERIC L. FAUST & PAUL J.
BRANTINGHAM, JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY 550-57 (1974), reprinted in ROBERT H. MNOOKIN
& KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 988 (2d ed. 1989) (observing that judges were
given broad discretion to "[take] up the burden of parenthood and [stand] between all children and
the manifest dangers of parental laxness and urban temptation")).
47. "Parens patriae" literally means "parent of the country" and refers to the role of the state
as guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144
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By the mid twentieth century, however, it had become increasingly clear
that the system was not meeting its rehabilitative goals and was depriving chil-
dren of fundamental constitutional rights.4 8 Characterizing dispositions as "su-
pervision" rather than punishment, juvenile courts frequently imposed indeter-
minate sentences that bore little relation to the crime charged.4 9 In 1966, the
Supreme Court expressed concern that the historical justification for omitting
procedural safeguards from the juvenile court-namely, the compensating bene-
fit of individualized treatment-was no longer sufficient. 50 In reality, the Court
worried, juveniles may receive the "worst of both worlds: ... neither the protec-
tion accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postu-
lated for children."
5 1
Several key cases created the due process protections that juveniles are
given today, the most sweeping of which was the Supreme Court's 1967 deci-
sion In re Gault.52 There, the Court held that the constitutional rights to notice,
to counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to a fair and impartial hear-
ing, and to protections against self-incrimination all applied equally in juvenile
court.53 "Unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is often a poor
(8th ed. 2004) (defining "parens patriae" as "the state in its capacity as provider of protection to
those unable to care for themselves"). Professor Feld has argued that "Progressives situated the
juvenile court on a number of cultural and criminological fault lines and institutionalized several
binary conceptions for the respective juvenile and criminal justice systems: either child or adult,
either determinism or free will, either treatment or punishment, either procedural informality or
formality, either discretion or the rule of law." Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Sys-
tems'Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 193 (1998).
48. Instrumental to this conclusion was a report generated by the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which found that, while "[iln theory the [juve-
nile] court's operations could justifiably be informal, its findings and decisions made without ob-
serving ordinary procedural safeguards, because it would act only in the best interest of the child,"
in reality "it frequently does nothing more nor less than deprive a child of liberty without due
process of law-knowing not what else to do and needing, whether admittedly or not, to act in the
community's interest even more imperatively than the child's"). PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CRIME 9 (1967).
49. The facts of In re Gault are illustrative. In the case, fifteen-year-old Gerry Gault was
committed to a state training facility until age twenty-one simply for making "lewd" remarks of the
"irritatingly offensive, adolescent sex variety" to an adult female neighbor-an offense for which
he likely would not have received jail time if he were an adult. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
50. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 551-52 (1966).
51. Id. at 556.
52. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1.
53. Id. at 31-58. Professor Feld has suggested that the Court's reconstruction of juvenile
court procedures can be attributed in part to an awareness that minority offenders often failed to
receive equal treatment at the hands of the court. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra
note 44, at 1448-51. Feld observes that several surveys conducted at the time Gault was decided
indicated that minority offenders were vastly overrepresented in the nation's largest juvenile
courts. Id. at 1484-85 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
supra note 48). "It is an historical irony that concern about racial inequality provided the initial
impetus for the Supreme Court's focus on procedural rights in states' juvenile justice systems,"
Feld observes, "because it was the existence of those procedural rights that rationalized increas-
ingly punitive penalties that fall most heavily on minority juvenile offenders." Id.
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substitute for principle and procedure," the Court warned.54 Additional cases
followed during the next decade which mandated that delinquency convictions
be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt" 55 and deemed it unconstitutional to
prosecute juveniles for the same offense in both juvenile and criminal court.56
However, while the Court has been willing to extend certain due process
protections to juvenile proceedings, it has expressly refused to grant juveniles all
of the procedural rights afforded adults. In 1971, the Court held that juveniles
had no constitutional right to a jury trial in state delinquency proceedings, on the
grounds that adjudications rendered by a judge were sufficient to meet the "fun-
damental fairness" standard required under the Due Process Clause. 57 "We are
reluctant to disallow the States to experiment further and to seek in new and dif-
ferent ways the elusive answers to the problems of the young," the Court ex-
plained in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, "and we feel that we would be impeding
that experimentation by imposing the jury trial."58
Thirteen years later, the Court held that the preventative detention of juve-
niles before adjudication did not violate the Constitution.59 In Schall v. Martin,
the Court found that a New York statute permitting "a brief pretrial detention of
a youth based on a finding of a 'serious risk' that an arrested juvenile may com-
mit a crime before his return date" met the due process "fundamental fairness"
standard.60 Since the procedural protections afforded detainees prior to adjudi-
cation under Gault and its progeny-namely, the rights to notice, a statement of
the facts and reasons for detention, and a probable-cause hearing within a short
time-themselves satisfied due process requirements, the juvenile's liberty inter-
ests did not outweigh the legitimacy of the state's interest in preventive deten-
tion, the Court concluded.61
As I discuss more fully in Part III.B, the Court's decision in Schall has been
roundly criticized. Implicit in the Court's rationale for subordinating the juve-
nile's liberty interest to society's interest in preventing crime was the assumption
that juvenile courts could accurately predict which defendants would be most
likely to reoffend - a notion that has been consistently refuted.62 "In essence,"
54. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18.
55. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that, even in delinquency proceedings,
the Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged").
56. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 543 (1975) (finding prosecution in criminal court following
adjudication in juvenile court a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
57. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (reasoning that "[t]he imposition of
the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the fact-finding
function, and would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the juvenile court's assumed ability to func-
tion in a unique manner").
58. Id.
59. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256-57 (1984).
60. Id. at 256-57, 263.
61. Id. at 274-78.
62. See FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 13, at 141-42 (citing Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggen-
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writes Professor Barry Feld, "Schall affirms judicial discretion, elevates 'crime
control' over 'due process' values and the rule of law, and delegates to each
judge the authority to balance the risk to the community and an individual's lib-
erty on an idiosyncratic and ad hoc basis." 63
The impact of McKeiver and Schall has been made all the more significant
by corresponding changes in legislation governing juvenile court dispositions.
Fueled by the "tough on crime" movement of the 1980s and 1990s, legislatures
across the country amended their juvenile codes' purpose clauses to incorporate
expressly punitive language, enacted determinate and mandatory-minimum sen-
tencing statutes, expanded eligibility for criminal court processing and adult cor-
rectional sanctioning, and reduced confidentiality protections for a subset of ju-
venile offenders. 64 By the end of 2004, juvenile codes in every state allowed
juvenile court records to be released to prosecutors, law enforcement, social ser-
vices agencies, schools, and/or victims; permitted law enforcement agencies to
fingerprint and photograph juveniles under certain circumstances; and exposed a
subset of juveniles to some form of criminal sanctions. Codes in forty-five states
and the District of Columbia allowed juvenile court judges to waive jurisdiction
over certain cases and transfer them to criminal court. Codes in twenty-nine
states contained statutory exclusion provisions exempting certain cases from ju-
venile court jurisdiction altogether, and fifteen states had blended sentencing
laws that enabled juvenile courts to impose criminal sanctions on certain juvenile
offenders. 6
5
Nonetheless, while today's juvenile court looks and acts a lot more like a
criminal court than it did forty years ago, it has-in part as a consequence of the
Court's refusal to engraft into juvenile court proceedings all of the protections
available in adult court-retained an aura of informality and unpredictability that
continues to distinguish it from its adult counterpart. Abolitionists and preserva-
tionists of the juvenile court agree that this apparent attempt to have it both
ways-to pursue punishment and treatment, intervention and confinement, pro-
portionality and rehabilitation, formality and informality-has created an entity
that does none of these particularly well. 66
heim, Preventive Detention and the Judicial Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural
Experiment, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 415 (1996)).
63. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 13, at 145.
64. See SHAY BILCHIK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 1999 NATIONAL REPORT SERIES, JUVENILE
JUSTICE: A CENTURY OF CHANGE 19 (1999) (reporting that, from 1992 through 1997 alone, statutes
requiring mandatory minimum periods of incarceration for certain violent or serious offenders
were added or modified in sixteen states, statutes extending the age limit for juvenile delinquency
dispositions were adopted by seventeen states, and "blended sentencing" statutes, which allow
courts to impose juvenile and/or adult correctional sanctions on certain young offenders, were in
place in twenty states at the end of 1997).
65. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006, supra note 23, at
108-16 (discussing legislation enacted during the last thirty years emphasizing proportionality and
determinate sentencing).
66. Compare Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part II: Race and the
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B. Juvenile Court Processing and Decision-Making
At 6:30 a.m. the next morning, Jason was back in the Sheriff's van on his
way to Boston Juvenile Court. The "BJC," as it is known, occupies the fifth
floor of a cavernous concrete building in Boston. The van pulled up to a loading
dock off of the building's basement, and four boys in leg shackles and handcuffs
shuffled into the cold, gray maze of holding cells.
Jason met the woman who would become his first delinquency lawyer two
hours later. He reluctantly answered her questions through the holding cell
bars.
"Where do you live? " "233 Morton Street in Mattapan."
"Is it a house or an apartment?" "It's a foster home."
"So you're in DSS custody?" "Yeah."
Jason started to explain that he was about to get a new placement. That he
was going to live with his biological mother for the first time in fourteen years.
That she had just gotten out of rehab and was living in a studio apartment in
Roxbury. That he had heard she was using again. That his social worker hadn't
listened to him when he told her he was uncomfortable with the placement.
But the lawyer seemed like she was in hurry, so he decided just to answer
her questions.
"Do you attend school regularly? " "Yeah."
Jason considered coming clean with her. He thought about telling her that
while he was going to school everyday, he was generally leaving after first pe-
riod. But what did school have to do with any of this anyway, he thought.
"All right, " the lawyer concluded. "I'll go see if your social worker's out-
side. "
"I doubt it, "Jason muttered under his breath as the lawyer's heels echoed
down the corridor.
Predictably, the schizophrenic orientation of the juvenile justice system di-
rectly impacts its day-to-day practices. Though processing patterns vary from
"Crack Down " on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REv. 327, 331 (1999) (advocating the abolition of the
juvenile court because, among other things, "[t]he juvenile court's effort to combine social welfare
and criminal social control in one agency simply assures that it pursues both missions badly") and
Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36
B.C. L. Rev. 927, 928 (1995) (advocating the abolition of the juvenile court on the grounds that it
is a flawed system that provides juveniles with procedurally and substantively inferior adjudication
in comparison to that accorded adult defendants) with Thomas F. Geraghty, Justice for Children:
How Do We Get There?, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 190, 211-12 (1997) (advocating the pres-
ervation and revitalization of the juvenile justice system while acknowledging that it "has failed to
satisfy expectations for providing procedural protection and successful interventions") and Irene
Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists,
1993 Wis. L. REv. 163, 165 (1993) (arguing for the preservation of the juvenile justice system, but
criticizing juvenile courts for providing both inadequate procedural protections and inadequate
dispositional programs).
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locality to locality, 6 7 there are generally six principal stages of juvenile justice
decision-making: arrest, intake, pretrial detention, waiver or transfer to adult
court, adjudication, and disposition.68 While these six processing points resem-
ble their criminal counterparts in certain respects, there are discemable differ-
ences, many of which can be attributed to the juvenile court's lack of procedural
safeguards. First, in addition to depriving youth of what the Supreme Court has
called the fundamental "protection of life and liberty against race or color preju-
dice" 69 at adjudication, the absence of jury trials in most jurisdictions indirectly
affects other stages of processing by minimizing the overall visibility and ac-
countability of juvenile court actors. 70 That juvenile court proceedings are con-
ducted, for the most part, behind closed doors only adds to this sense of immu-
nity. 7 1 Moreover, the regular use of preventive pretrial detention-a mechanism
whose use is strictly limited in criminal court72-further compromises the pro-
cedural integrity of the juvenile court by providing a comparative advantage to
the state before a case even begins. The tendency for juveniles faced with the
prospect of an indefinite confinement to admit to, rather than fight, the charges
against them provides a tactical advantage for prosecutors, who have discretion
to recommend pretrial detention irrespective of the juvenile's proclivity for
"dangerousness." 73 Finally, the juvenile court's adherence to strains of its origi-
nal parens patriae orientation necessarily requires administrators, often with
little or no clinical training, to base processing decisions on impressionistic
67. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 13, at 112-13 (observing that juvenile justice administration
varies significantly among the states and even within a single state).
68. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006, supra note 23, at
104.
69. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879) (holding that a West Virginia statute
barring African Americans from serving on juries violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
70. See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sen-
tence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile
Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1150-51 (2003) (arguing that "[t]he jury's checking func-
tion may be even more important in the highly discretionary, low-visibility juvenile justice system
dealing with dependent youths who are unable effectively to protect themselves").
71. Concerns about such a lack of public accountability have driven a number of jurisdictions
to open their juvenile proceedings. As of 2004, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington
had all adopted presumptively open juvenile court proceedings. Kristen Henning, Eroding Confi-
dentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Noti-
fied?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 537 n.89 (2004).
72. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (holding that a criminal defen-
dant's liberty interest should be subordinated to the interests of public safety only "when the Gov-
ernment musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a serious
crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the community").
73. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Defining the Limits of Crime Control and Due Process, 73
CAL. L. REV. 212, 233 n.43 (1985) (reviewing HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
(1982)) (discussing the author's contention that "[p]retrial detention ... serves to coerce guilty
pleas, testimony, and other forms of cooperation; assures the defendant's availability for interroga-
tion or identification procedures; and results in the speedy imposition of informal punishment on
defendants who may never be convicted or given a formal custody sentence").
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diagnoses of not only the gravity of the offense but also the rehabilitative poten-
tial of the offender-a calculus that necessarily leads to inconsistent outcomes.
74
While there are plainly benevolent and compelling justifications for these
practices, there are also significant drawbacks. From a procedural perspective,
these characteristics have the effect of tipping the proverbial playing field toward
the state. From an ideological perspective, they often have the effect of devalu-
ing the rule of law for the sake of administrative efficiency and paternalistic as-
sumptions about what is best for each child. An examination of juvenile court
decision-making at each of the six processing points is illustrative; in what fol-
lows, I discuss each processing point and its differences from its criminal justice
analog. While the decision to arrest a juvenile rests on many of the same factors
as does the decision to arrest an adult, the intake, detention, waiver, adjudication,
and, to a lesser extent, disposition decisions are distinct from their criminal
equivalents in both practice and substance.
First, at the point of arrest, police officers have much the same unfettered
leeway to take a juvenile into custody as they do an adult.75 In most states, the
evidentiary standard governing arrests is the same for both juveniles and adults:
a suspect may lawfully be arrested if there is probable cause to believe that she
has or is committing a felony or one of a specified class of misdemeanors.
76
Despite this presumptively objective standard, however, studies of police/
juvenile encounters conducted over the last forty years suggest that the decision
to arrest a juvenile is often influenced at least in part by the attributes of the of-
fender. A seminal longitudinal study of the conditions influencing police inter-
actions with juveniles, conducted by sociologists Irving Piliavin and Scott Briar
in 1964, found that, aside from the juvenile's prior arrest record, the juvenile's
demeanor was the single most important factor in deciding whether to make an
arrest. 77 "The cues used by police to assess demeanor were fairly simple," Pi-
74. See FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 13, at 140-45 (discussing the juvenile courts' continued
reliance on discretionary clinical prediction methods which require unqualified decision-makers to
make predictions about a juvenile's future behavior through an assessment of various social status
factors that are beyond the youth's control).
75. For all practical purposes, the procedural nature of this processing point is essentially the
same in both the juvenile and criminal justice systems. Whether exercised against juveniles or
adults, it is clear that the decision to arrest is highly discretionary. See generally Joseph Goldstein,
Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administra-
tion of Justice, 69 YALE L. REV. 543 (1960); Wayne R. LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of
the Law-Part I, 1962 WiS. L. REV. 104 (1962); David Wolcott, "The Cop Will Get You": The
Police and Discretionary Juvenile Justice, 1890-1940, 35 J. Soc. HIST. 349 (2001) (noting that law
enforcement performs a filtering function in deciding which complaints against children and teen-
agers to handle informally).
76. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 305.2(2) (McKinney 1999) (providing that a child under
age sixteen may be taken into custody without a warrant whenever a peace or police officer could
arrest an adult); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 52.01 (Vernon 2006) (providing that a child may be taken
into custody by law enforcement officers, including school-district peace officers, if there is prob-
able cause to believe that the child has engaged in conduct that violates a penal law).
77. Irving Piliavin & Scott Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 AM. J. Soc. 206, 210
(1964) (noting that "[iun the opinion of juvenile patrolmen themselves the demeanor of appre-
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lavin and Briar observed.
Juveniles who were contrite about their infractions, respectful to offi-
cers, and fearful of the sanctions that might be employed against them
tended to be viewed by patrolmen as . . ."salvageable." For these
youths it was usually assumed that informal or formal reprimand would
suffice .... In contrast, youthful offenders who were fractious, obdu-
rate, or who appeared nonchalant in their encounters with patrolmen
were likely to be viewed as "would-be tough guys" or "punks" who
fully deserved the most severe sanction: arrest. 78
Piliavin and Briar's conclusions have been supported by several more recent
studies of juvenile arrests.79 In comparison, while studies of adult arrests tend to
emphasize the paramount importance of the severity of the offense, they also
conclude that, as with juvenile arrests, the suspect's behavior can be critical.8 °
Once a case is referred to court, 8 1 however, differences between juvenile
and criminal justice processing begin to emerge. In juvenile court, intake officers,
hended juveniles was a major determinant of their decisions for 50 to 60 per cent of the juvenile
cases they processed").
78. Id. at210-11.
79. See, e.g., Darlene J. Conley, Adding Color to a Black and White Picture: Using Qualita-
tive Data to Explain Racial Disproportionality in the Juvenile Justice System, 31 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 135, 136 (1994) (suggesting, in a qualitative study of nearly 1800 cases observed through
"ride alongs" and 170 in-depth interviews with police officers, that "what occurs before and at the
level of arrest ... is perhaps the most important factor contributing to racial and ethnic dispropor-
tionality [because e]ncounters between police and youths of color shape perceptions and behav-
iors"); Richard J. Lundman, Richard E. Sykes & John P. Clark, Police Control of Juveniles: A
Replication, 15 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 74, 84 (1978) (concluding, through an empirical analysis
of 200 encounters between juveniles and police derived from observations made during "ride
alongs" over a fifteen-month period, that in cases where the arrest was made without a witness,
"the demeanor of the juvenile is the most important determinant of whether or not formal action is
taken"); Douglas A. Smith & Christy A. Visher, Street Level Justice: Situational Determinants of
Police Arrest Decisions, 29 Soc. PROBS. 167, 168-69 (1981) (finding that the decision to arrest is
often based on the manner in which the encounter is initiated (i.e., whether or not police them-
selves initiate the contact); the location of the encounter; the presence of bystanders or witnesses;
the presence or absence of complainants; the victim/suspect relationship; and the characteristics of
the suspect, such as race, age, gender, and demeanor).
80. See, e.g., Douglas A. Smith, The Organizational Context of Legal Control, 22
CRIMINOLOGY 19, 27 (1984) (finding in a multivariate analysis of over 1000 direct observations of
police/citizen encounters that arrest decisions were "significantly more likely in encounters with
antagonistic suspects"); Richard E. Sykes, James C. Fox & John P. Clarke, A Social-Legal Theory
of Police Discretion, in THE AMBIVALENT FORCE 171, 178-79 (Arthur Niederhoffer & Abraham S.
Blumberg eds., 1976) (finding in a study of 3000 police/citizen encounters that, in addition to the
seriousness of the offense, several other factors correlated with the decision to arrest, including the
suspect's demeanor).
81. While the majority of delinquency cases are referred to juvenile court by law enforce-
ment, cases may also be referred by parents, schools, or probation officers. According to OJJDP,
"nearly half of all cases referred to juvenile court intake are handled informally." SNYDER &
SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006, supra note 23, at 104. Many informally
processed cases are dismissed, while in others, "the juvenile voluntarily agrees to abide by specific
conditions for a specific time period." Id.
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predominantly court clerks or probation officers, decide whether to handle a case
informally or to proceed with one of two types of petitions: a delinquency peti-
tion documenting the allegations and requesting that the juvenile court adjudi-
cate the youth a delinquent, or a petition requesting a waiver hearing to transfer
the case to criminal court.82 While this decision is based in part on an assess-
ment of whether the intake officer believes that there is sufficient evidence to
prove the charges in question, it is also based on an evaluation of the socio-
familial attributes of the juvenile herself. In California, for example, a social
worker or probation officer performing intake must consider:
(1) Whether there is sufficient evidence of a condition or conduct to
bring the child within the jurisdiction of the court;
(2) If the alleged condition or conduct is not considered serious,
whether the child has previously presented significant problems in the
home, school, or community;
(3) Whether the matter appears to have arisen from a temporary prob-
lem within the family that has been or can be resolved;
(4) Whether any agency or other resource in the community is available
to offer services to the child and the child's family to prevent or elimi-
nate the need to remove the child from the child's home;
(5) The attitudes of the child, the parent or guardian, and any affected
persons;
(6) The age, maturity, and capabilities of the child;
(7) The dependency or delinquency history, if any, of the child;
(8) The recommendation, if any, of the referring party or agency; and
(9) Any other circumstances that indicate that settling the matter at in-
take would be consistent with the welfare of the child and the protection
of the public. 8
3
Significantly, in at least one study of juvenile intake decisions, intake offi-
cers actually acknowledged the strong correlation between race and the socio-
familial criteria they were required to consider.
84
82. Id. Intake officers also decide in many jurisdictions whether to detain the juvenile pend-
ing arraignment. If a juvenile is detained, a hearing must be held within a time limit defined by
state statute. PATRICIA PURITZ, AM. BAR ASS'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 31 (1995).
83. CAL. CT. R. 5.516(a) (Amend. 2007).
84. In their study of juvenile-court decision-making practices in Florida, sociologists Donna
Bishop and Charles Frazier characterized the following comments made by a Florida delinquency
intake supervisor as "typical":
Our manual told us to interview the child and the parent prior to making a recommenda-
tion to the state's attorney. We are less able to reach poor and minority clients. They
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For those youth who are detained pending arraignment, a detention hearing
is then held to determine whether to continue to detain the youth pending trial.8 5
Historically, pretrial detention was supposed to serve one main purpose: to en-
sure that the juvenile appeared for future court proceedings. 86 Today, however,
the majority of states have enacted preventive detention statutes akin to the New
York statute at issue in Schall v. Martin.87 The reliance on preventive detention
in the juvenile justice system continues to be controversial, not only because of
the uncertain validity of judicial predictions of dangerousness, but also because
of the type of offenders for which it is used. 88 Between 1985 and 1995 alone,
the national daily juvenile detention population climbed by 72% to nearly
24,000.89 The majority of these youth, however, were non-violent offenders.
During a one-day snapshot in 1995, for instance, less than one-third of the youth
in secure custody were charged with violent acts. 90
The indeterminate and subjective nature of many juvenile preventive deten-
tion statutes may add to the risk of arbitrary outcomes. In Wisconsin, for exam-
ple, the court can hold a juvenile in pretrial detention if probable cause exists to
believe any of the following:
(a) That if the juvenile is not held he or she will commit injury to the
person or property of others.
(b) That the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the juvenile or other
responsible adult is neglecting, refusing, unable, or unavailable to pro-
vide adequate supervision and care and that services to ensure the juve-
nile's safety and well-being are not available or would be inadequate.
(c) That the juvenile will run away or be taken away so as to be un-
available for proceedings of the court or its officers .... 91
Thus, by statute, Wisconsin juvenile court judges are required not only to
assess the juvenile's conduct, but also to base detention decisions on normative
judgments about the relative "adequa[cy]" of the juvenile's "supervision and
care." Arguably, the level of supervision exercised by a juvenile's family is in
are less responsive to attempts to reach them. They don't show. They don't have
transportation. Then they are more likely to be recommended for formal processing.
Without access to a client's family, the less severe options are closed. Once it gets to
court, the case is likely to be adjudicated because it got there. It's a self fulfilling
prophecy.
Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-Making: Find-
ings ofa Statewide Analysis, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392, 407-08 (1996).
85. SNYDER & SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999, supra note 8, at 98.
86. Fagan & Guggenheim, supra note 62, at 415.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 416.
89. DAVID STEINHART, THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., PLANNING FOR JUVENILE DETENTION
REFORM: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 10 (1999).
90. Id. at 5.
91. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.205 (West 2005).
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fact germane to the juvenile's proclivity for dangerousness. 92 But because, in
most courts, this calculus is made not through a comprehensive psycho-social
evaluation of the juvenile and her family, but through unverified and anecdotal
information presented in the course of a single, transitory appearance, it is highly
susceptible to the influence of attributional stereotypes.
93
Conversely, while predictive decision-making plainly plays a role in the
criminal justice system, it is constrained by important procedural safeguards not
available in juvenile court. As an initial matter, adults are entitled to bail, while,
in most states, juveniles are not.94 The practical effect is that pretrial detention
in juvenile court is an all-or-nothing proposition. Judges cannot temper their
orders to account for the relative degree of risk presented, as they can in criminal
court. Another major difference between the detention hearing in juvenile court
and the bail hearing in criminal court is the burden of proof borne by prosecu-
tors. Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, a criminal defendant may not be held
without bail unless a prosecutor can establish "by clear and convincing evi-
dence" that the defendant will fail to return to court, obstruct justice, or intimi-
date a witness or juror, and that there are no conditions of release which could
reasonably ensure the public's safety. 95 This exacting burden of proof necessar-
ily creates a process that is adversarial and formal.
92. Anecdotal evidence supports the notion that judges often weigh extralegal criteria more
heavily than legal criteria. In August 2005, for example, Boston Juvenile Court Judge Paul
Lewis's decision to set a $250,000 bail for a twelve-year-old, first-time offender found with a
loaded firearm drew harsh criticism from local juvenile justice advocates. E.g., Maria Cramer &
John Ellement, Boy's High Bail Concerns Youth Advocates, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 25, 2005.
When asked to explain his bail decision, Judge Lewis responded, "I'm looking to find out what this
kid is doing, his responsibility factor, whether he's keeping the rules of the school or the home. If
he isn't, then I have a right to set bail accordingly." Id. What Judge Lewis did not cite to, how-
ever, was the factor that advocates argued was most relevant to the bail decision: whether there is
any evidence to suggest that the juvenile would not return to court. See also Bishop & Frazier,
supra note 84, at 409-10 (citing a Florida state attorney's acknowledgment that "[d]etention deci-
sions are decided on the basis of whether the home can control and supervise a child").
93. See, e.g., George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of
Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 554,
567-68 (1998); FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 13, at 142 (arguing that judges may deprive youths of
liberty simply because they "share the characteristics of a larger group of 'potentially dangerous'
youths").
94. As of 2004, only sixteen states had statutes that explicitly permit bail for juveniles in pre-
adjudicatory proceedings. They are: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia. See L. SZYMANSKI, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE'S
RIGHT TO BAIL IN PRE-ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS (2005). Seventeen states and the District of
Columbia have case law, statutes, or court rules specifically denying juveniles the right to pre-
adjudicatory bail: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and
Utah. Id.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987), the Supreme
Court held that a defendant's liberty interests should be subordinated to the interests of community
safety only "when the government musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or
held to answer for a serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the community."
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The pretrial detention hearing in juvenile court is often anything but. Apart
from the comparative informality of most juvenile court proceedings, the arbi-
trary nature of many detention hearings can also be attributed to the absence of
counsel.96 In fact, juvenile codes in certain states do not even require courts to
appoint attorneys at the detention stage. Virginia law, for example, does not
specifically provide for the right to counsel at arrest, intake, or the initial deten-
tion hearing. 97 The absence of counsel, according to OJJDP, is one of the likely
causes of "Virginia's high rate of detention (nearly twice the national aver-
age)."98 Other states have no uniform process to appoint public defenders for
juvenile defendants at any point in the process and no eligibility criteria for indi-
gency.99 Moreover, even when state law does afford juveniles the right to coun-
sel at the pretrial detention hearing, juveniles frequently waive counsel's appear-
ance. According to OJJDP, "[i]n some jurisdictions, as many as 80 to 90 percent
of youth waive their right to an attorney because they do not know the meaning
of the word 'waive' or understand its consequences."' 00 And finally, when at-
torneys do appear at detention hearings, they are frequently untrained in juvenile
court procedures, inexperienced, and overburdened.' 01
What is most unsettling about this lack of protection and regularity is that
modem-day detention is hardly the therapeutic respite envisioned by the Pro-
gressives. Generally speaking, the conditions of detention facilities in the United
States are poor. 10 2 By the early 1990s, 60% of youth admitted to secure deten-
tion encountered a facility that was crowded beyond its designed capacity.
10 3
96. See, e.g., PATRICIA PURITZ, AM. BAR ASS'N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS (1995) (finding that numerous factors deprive indigent children across the country of
adequate legal services, including, among other things, the frequency with which children waive
their right to counsel and under what conditions they do so, and the lack of adequate compensation,
supervision, and training of juvenile defense attorneys).
97. JUDITH B. JONES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN: ACCESS TO
COUNSEL 6 (2004).
98. Id. at 7.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2. See also PATRICIA PURITZ & CATHRYN CRAWFORD, NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER
CTR., FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 28 (2006) (reporting that "judges and parents in Florida courts engage
in practices and procedures that pressure youth, directly or indirectly, to waive the right to coun-
sel").
101. See JONES, supra note 97, at 9 (reporting that the average juvenile caseload in a national
survey conducted between 2000 and 2003 by the American Bar Association (ABA) was 300 of a
total caseload exceeding 500); id. at 11 (reporting that a 1995 ABA national study found that 78
percent of the public defender offices surveyed "said they had no budget for training juvenile de-
fense attorneys; 50 percent did not have a training program for new attorneys, and 48 percent had
no ongoing training program; 46 percent lacked a training manual for juvenile defense practice;
and 32 percent had no training manual at all").
102. See generally DALE G. PARENT, VALERIE LIETER, STEPHEN KENNEDY, LISA LIVENS,
DANIEL WENTWORTH & SARAH WILCOX, CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONS FACILITIES (1994).
103. See STEINHART, supra note 89, at 10.
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More than just a "housekeeping problem that simply requires facility administra-
tors to put extra mattresses in day rooms when it's time for lights out," over-
crowding often leads to inadequate medical, mental health, safety, education, and
recreation services.10 4 Moreover, studies indicate that whether or not a juvenile
is detained at arraignment has a significant impact on whether she will be com-
mitted at disposition, in part because "[t]he state's assumption of guilt inherent
in detaining before trial becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy."'10 5 For the most
part, the use of pretrial detention for juveniles in this country is at best ineffec-
tual and at worst inequitable, coercive, and psychologically destructive-a result
that could hardly be more at odds with the system's ideological goals.
Like the intake and pretrial detention decisions, the decision to waive a ju-
venile to adult court is often based as much on the attributes of the offender as it
is on the attributes of the offense. As of 2004, forty-five states and the District
of Columbia allowed juvenile court judges to "waive jurisdiction over certain
cases and transfer them to criminal court." 106 According to OJJDP, "waiver pro-
visions vary in terms of the degree of decisionmaking flexibility allowed. The
decision may be entirely discretionary, there may be a rebuttable presumption in
favor of waiver, or waiver may be mandatory." 10 7 In Maryland, for example,
juvenile court judges base waiver decisions on the following five criteria:
(1) the age of the child; (2) the mental and physical condition of the
child; (3) the child's amenability to treatment in any institution, facility,
or program available to delinquents; (4) the nature of the offense and
the child's alleged participation in it; and (5) the public safety. 108
Research suggests that these factors can lead to arbitrary outcomes. One
particular study, which looked at Minnesota juvenile court cases waived to adult
court during a two-year period, concluded that waiver decisions varied widely by
geographic region even though the waiver statute was intended to be applied uni-
formly throughout the state. 1
09
Fifth, unlike adult court, adjudication in juvenile court is most often ren-
dered through confidential and informal bench trials. While juvenile court bench
104. Id. at 6. See generally BURRELL, supra note 34.
105. Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 335, 416 (1990). See also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., JUVENILE CRIME,
JUVENILE JUSTICE 177 (2001) ("Research consistently shows that juveniles who have been in de-
tention are more likely to be formally processed and receive more punitive sanctions at disposition
than those not placed in detention, after controlling for demographic and legal factors, such as
current offense and history of past offenses."); FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 13, at 138 (noting that
"pretrial detention negatively affects subsequent sentences that juveniles receive; detaining a youth
before trial increases the likelihood of additional post-adjudication sanctions as well").
106. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006, supra note 23, at
112.
107. Id.
108. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-06(e) (West 2005).
109. Barry C. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases: Reflections on Teen-Aged Axe-Murderers,
Judicial Activism, and Legislative Default, 8 LAW & INEQ. 1 (1989).
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trials share some of the features of a criminal court trial, the absence of a jury in
most jurisdictions can compromise the accuracy, integrity, and the overall fair-
ness of the process. Studies suggest that juries are more likely to acquit than
judges, in part because they apply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
more rigorously.' 10 Moreover, a juvenile defendant's "youthfulness" is more
likely to elicit leniency from a jury than from a juvenile court judge, l ' who may
be desensitized to the notion of incarcerating young people. Indeed, at least one
study has concluded that "it is easier to win a conviction in the juvenile court
than in the criminal court, with comparable types of cases."' 112 Compounding
this potential for inequity is the fact that juvenile court judges operate largely
under the public radar. They therefore escape both the visibility and account-
ability of their criminal court counterparts. All told, "McKeiver's denial of pub-
lic and jury trials places juvenile offenders at a comparative disadvantage," Pro-
fessor Feld writes, "and exposes youths to the coercive power of the state under
circumstances the law does not tolerate for adults." 113
Finally, if a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent, a judge then determines the
appropriate disposition. As a general matter, the judge has discretion to choose a
disposition from an array of options, which include: commitment to a public or
private institution or residential facility; probation; referral to a substance abuse
or mental health treatment program or other type of counseling; community ser-
vice, fines, or restitution; or any combination of these. 114 In most states, courts
are statutorily required to render the disposition that is "in the best interests of
the juvenile." 115 To aid in this determination, juvenile court judges often rely on
probation officers to prepare a disposition plan, which may include such things
110. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); PETER
GREENWOOD, ALBERT J. LIPSON, ALLEN ABRAHAMSE & FRANKLIN ZIMRING, YOUTH CRIME AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA (1983) (concluding through a study comparing juvenile and adult
court attrition rates that, in comparable cases, it is easier to win a conviction in juvenile court).
111. See FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 13, at 154. See also Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Remnants
of Parens Patriae in the Adjudication Hearing: Is a Fair Trial Possible in Juvenile Court?, 40
CRIME & DELINQ. 599, 603-04 (1994) (reporting results of a survey of probation officers and at-
torneys in juvenile courts; almost half "maintained that judges adjudicated juvenile delinquent
even when there was not proof beyond a reasonable doubt").
112. GREENWOOD, LIPSON, ABRAHAMSE & ZIMRING, supra note 110, at 30-31.
113. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 13, at 162.
114. NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
GUIDELINES, IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 147-53 (2005).
115. For example, Massachusetts law provides: "If a child is adjudicated a delinquent child
on a complaint, the court may place the case on file or may place the child in the care of a proba-
tion officer for such time and on such conditions as it deems appropriate or may commit him to the
custody of the department of youth services .... [Wihenever a court of competent jurisdiction
adjudicates a child as delinquent and commits the child to the department of youth services, the
court... shall receive evidence in order to determine whether continuation of the child in his home
is contrary to his best interest, and whether reasonable efforts were made prior to the commitment
of the child to the department, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal from his home." MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 58.
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as the results of psychological assessments and interviews with the youth and his
family. 116
Ironically, it is during the dispositional phase-arguably, the point where
the juvenile courts' rehabilitative orientation could best be realized-that many
courts seem to abandon their social welfare ideology altogether. During the last
three decades, legislatures in jurisdictions throughout the country have changed
their juvenile court purpose clauses to emphasize the punitive component of ju-
venile court sanctions. 117 As of 1997, nearly half of the states used determinate
or mandatory minimum provisions that "base a youth's disposition on the of-
fense she committed rather than her 'real needs' to regulate at least some aspects
of sentence duration, institutional commitment, or release." 118
What is ultimately clear from a review of each of the six decision points is
that, despite the juvenile justice system's gravitation toward its adult counterpart,
the system is not yet its procedural or ideological equivalent. While, as in adult
court, processing decisions may be tied to a written set of uniform criteria, the
juvenile court's lack of fundamental procedural safeguards and its emphasis on
social factors that necessitate the imposition of subjective value judgments
heighten the risk that impermissible factors, such as race, will influence out-
'19comes.19
116. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006, supra note 23, at
106.
117. Id. at 97-99.
118. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 7, at 83-86 (noting that "[empirical
evaluations of juvenile court sentencing practices indicate that the present offense and prior record
account for most of the explained variance in judges' disposition of delinquents, and reinforce the
criminal orientation of juvenile courts"). Nonetheless, courts do account for social factors. In
New York, for example, a family court judge is required by statute to consider the following fac-
tors in deciding whether to impose a custodial sentence:
(a) the needs and best interests of the [defendant];
(b) the record and background of the [defendant], including but not limited to informa-
tion disclosed in the probation investigation and diagnostic assessment;
(c) the nature and circumstances of the offense, including whether any injury was in-
flicted by the [defendant] or another participant;
(d) the need for protection of the community; and
(e) the age and physical condition of the victim.
N.Y. Family Court Act § 353.5. See also Allan Horwitz & Michael Wasserman, Some Misleading
Conceptions in Sentencing Research: An Example and Reformulation in the Juvenile Court, 18
CRIMINOLOGY 411, 417 (1980) (observing that factors such as "problems in the family and at
school," in addition to legal criteria, impact sentencing).
119. See Charles E. Frazier & Donna M. Bishop, Reflections on Race Effects in Juvenile Jus-
tice, in MINORITIES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 16, 35-36 (Kimberly Kempf Leonard, Carl E. Pope &
William H. Feyerherm eds., 1995) ("When decisions to process juveniles formally as opposed to
informally, or harshly as opposed to leniently, hinge on evaluations of the social circumstances in
which juveniles live ... [a]lmost inevitably there is a reliance on common stereotypes of the non-
white community, family, and interpersonal styles").
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II.
THE PHENOMENON OF DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT
A. Statistical Evidence of DMC in the Juvenile Justice System
Jason was charged with trespassing and arraigned later that morning. Like
the rest of the building, Courtroom 18 of the BJC is a vast expanse of concrete
and marble. Though equipped for rows ofjurors and spectators, the courtroom
was virtually empty that morning, as it almost always was for juvenile proceed-
ings, but for the clerks, probation officers, and court officers milling around the
judge's bench.
As Jason stood at a table in the middle of the courtroom with his lawyer,
still wearing handcuffs and shackles, the prosecutor read the police report
aloud. "I know it's a trespass, " the prosecutor concluded, putting down her pa-
per, "but we're concerned about the location. The Commonwealth would be
looking for a low bail.-"120
"'Probation, what do you say?" The judge turned to a probation officer to
his immediate right. "We agree, " the officer said. "We talked with his social
worker, and he's not obeying the rules of the foster home. He's not attending
school regularly. Foster mom doesn't know where he goes when he leaves the
house. "
The judge then turned to Jason 's lawyer. The lawyer reminded the judge
that there was no evidence that Jason was involved in any drug activity. More
importantly, his lawyer added, the primary purpose of bail was to ensure that the
juvenile returned to court and there was no reason to believe Jason wouldn't.
The judge paused. "I'm concerned that the young man is out at night at a
known drug residence. I'm also concerned about what his social worker told
probation, that he is not cooperating with the rules of the foster home, " the
judge added. "Let's give him some structure and keep him off the streets for a
couple weeks, and ifDSS wants to bail him out in the meantime, they can. A dol-
lar bail, DSS only. "
It has long been evident that the percentage of minority youth present in the
United States justice system far exceeds their proportion in the general popula-
tion.12 1 Over the last thirty years, multiple studies have shown that Dispropor-
tionate Minority Contact afflicts nearly every processing point in nearly every
120. As discussed in supra Part I.A, Massachusetts is one of the few states that affords juve-
niles the right to bail.
121. As far back as the 1920s, criminologists were attempting to identify the root causes of
minority overrepresentation. See, e.g., Thomsten Sellin, The Negro Criminal: A Statistical Note,
140 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 52 (1928); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA:
THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944).
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juvenile justice system in the country.122 Until recently, OJJDP calculated over-
representation by simply dividing the proportion of minority youth 123 at a par-
ticular processing point by the proportion of minority youth in the general popu-
lation. 12 4  If this statistic, known as the "DMC Index," was greater than 1.0,
disproportionality was said to exist. 125  According to OJJDP, however,
"[p]roblems interpreting the DMC Index soon became apparent." 126 Not only
did comparing one jurisdiction's Index with another's prove difficult, 12 7 the
DMC Index "provided limited guidance on where to look for the source(s) of
disparity."'
128
In 2002, OJJDP acknowledged that its DMC Index was methodologically
flawed and purported to improve it by adopting the DMC Relative Rate Index
(RRI). 129 The RRI tests for disparity by comparing the total volume of minority
youth present at a particular decision point with the corresponding percentage of
white youth. 130 Though more methodologically refined than the DMC Indices,
the DMC RRIs for 2002 tell largely the same story: that, with the exception of
adjudication, minorities fared worse than whites at every stage of the juvenile
justice process and that the effects were cumulative. 131
122. See, e.g., DMC: 1969-1989 Review of Research, supra note 19; DMC: 1989-2001
REVIEW OF LITERATURE, supra note 19; POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 19; FRANCISCO A.
VILLARRUEL & NANCY E. WALKER, BUILDING BOCKS FOR YOUTH, 41D6NDE ESTA LA JUSTICIA?: A
CALL TO ACTION ON BEHALF OF LATrNO AND LATINA YOUTH IN THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM (2002).
123. Because many studies documenting the incidence of minority overrepresentation catego-
rize Latino youth as white, they actually underreport the rates of such disparities. POE-YAMAGATA
& JONES, supra note 19, at 5.
124. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006, supra note 23, at
189.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. By way of illustration, OJJDP explained: "For example, assume one community's youth
population was 3% minority and its juvenile custody population was 12% minority, resulting in a
DMC Index of 4. Now assume the other community's youth population was 50% minority and its
custody population was 100% minority, resulting in a DMC Index of 2. Which community's juve-
nile justice system processing is most racially disparate? Clearly, the value of the DMC Index was
related in part to the proportion of minority youth in the general population. Communities with low
minority proportions could have very high DMC Indexes while communities with high percentages
of minority youth could not." Id. at 189.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 190.
130. Id. The Relative Rate Index Matrix adds greater detail by comparing the RRI at each
decision point with that of the previous decision point to "reveal the nature of decision disparities."
Id.
131. Specifically, of the approximately 26,000,000 white youth ages ten to seventeen in the
United States population in 2002, 1,576,400 were arrested (6.1% of the white youth in the general
population), 1,086,700 were referred to juvenile court (68.9% of the white youth arrested), 199,700
were detained (18.4% of the white youth referred), 596,800 were formally petitioned (54.9% of the
white youth referred), 4,400 were waived to criminal court (0.7% of the white youth formally peti-
tioned), 421,400 were adjudicated delinquent (70.6% of the white youth formally petitioned), and
90,400 were placed in secure facilities (21.5% of the white youth adjudicated delinquent). Id. at
189. Correspondingly, of the approximately 5,431,300 African American youth ages ten to seven-
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The RRI is an improvement over the DMC Index, in that it provides a more
sophisticated picture of the rate of disparities at various stages of the juvenile
process, but it still does not get at the question that is critical to an equal protec-
tion analysis: are the disparities observed solely the product of legitimate factors,
such as the nature of the offense or other aggravating or mitigating factors that
are race neutral, or, rather, does race itself influence case outcomes?
B. The Causes of DMC
Jason spent the two weeks after his November 19th arraignment in a deten-
tion unit of the Metro Youth Services Center in Dorchester. During his stay, he
received none of the special education services for which he had recently been
deemed eligible and, despite what his staff described as a "depressed affect, "no
psychological counseling. He shared a ten-by-ten room with another fifteen
year old, who, on one occasion, was taken to the hospital for attempting to cut
himself with a plastic knife. He witnessed several fights and was involved in
several others. And he saw his DSS worker just once-when she came to tell
him that, because DSS hadn't yet processed his new placement, she had no place
for him to go.
The hardest part about detention, however-what continued to torment Ja-
son in the days after he was released-was something no one but Jason had con-
sidered. Jason was a chronic bed wetter. He had been for as long as he could
remember. While most of the staff had been sympathetic, the residents had not.
Publicly, Jason ignored their taunts each morning as he rolled up his sheets;
privately, he was in agony.
Two primary theories are generally advanced to explain the causes of DMC:
the first is that children of color simply commit more serious offenses than other
youths, and the second is that race bias--conscious or unconscious-plays a role
in juvenile justice system processing.13 2 Overall, research that "contrasts youth
arrests and youth behavior" suggests that "African Americans, as teens, commit
teen in the United States population, 625,500 were arrested (11.5% of the African American youth
in the general population), 473,100 were referred to juvenile court (75.6% of the African American
youth arrested), 118,600 were detained (25.1% of the African American youth referred), 306,000
were formally petitioned (64.7% of the African American youth referred), 2,500 were waived to
criminal court (0.8% of the African American youth petitioned), 179,000 were adjudicated delin-
quent (58.5% of the African American youth petitioned), and 47,500 were placed in secure facili-
ties (26.5% of the African American youth adjudicated delinquent). Id. A comparison of the per-
centages at each decision point yields the DMC RRI for that stage: 1.9 at arrest, 1.1 at referral, 1.4
at detention, 1.2 at petitioning, 1. 1 at waiver, 0.8 at adjudication, and 1.2 at placement. Put another
way, the national DMC RRIs for 2002 indicate that African American youth were 1.9 times as
likely to be arrested, 1.1 times as likely to be referred to juvenile court, 1.4 times as likely to be
detained, 1.2 times as likely to be formally petitioned, 1.1 times as likely to be waived to adult
court, 0.8 times as likely to be adjudicated delinquent, and 1.2 times as likely to be placed in a
secure facility as white youth. Id.
132. See, e.g., POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 19, at 4.
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S.. slightly more violent crime" than white youth, and they commit "about the
same amount of property crime, and less drug crime than white youth."
133
However, "in no category can the marginal differences in white and African
American behavior explain the huge disparity in arrest or incarceration rates."
' 134
Thus, even accepting that differential offending may have some effect on DMC,
the statistical differences between the offending patterns of white youth and mi-
nority youth are simply not great enough to account for the statistical disparities
observed at any of the processing points in the juvenile justice system. 135 It has
become increasingly obvious that certain characteristics of the system itself con-
tribute to the problem of DMC.
Studies over the past thirty years, which have become increasingly sophisti-
cated, demonstrate the strong likelihood that in many jurisdictions race plays an
impermissible role in how children are treated in the juvenile courts.1 36 In 1990,
in what is now considered a path-breaking meta-analysis, researchers Carl Pope
and William Feyerherm concluded that, of the forty-six studies conducted be-
tween 1969 and 1989 regarding the relationship between race and processing in
juvenile justice systems around the country, two-thirds found that race nega-
tively affected outcomes for youth of color. 137  In 2002, Pope repeated this
analysis, this time focusing on studies completed between 1989 and 2001 .138 Of
the thirty-four studies reviewed, 80% of which employed multivariate analytic
approaches, twenty-five reported "race effects" in the processing of youth, which
resulted in poorer outcomes for youth of color; nine were inconclusive; and one
133. HoYTT, SCHIRALDI, SMITH & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 21, at 19-21 (noting that African
American youth are arrested at twice the rate of white youth for drug offenses and 2.5 times the
rate of white youth for weapons offenses, even though white youth report substantially higher lev-
els of drug use and commission of weapons crimes). One survey found African American and
Latino/a youth ages twelve to seventeen self-reported higher rates of gang involvement, property
theft over $50, and serious assault than white youth ages twelve to seventeen, but fewer instances
of vandalism, property theft less than $50, drug sales, and firearm possession. See SNYDER &
SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006, supra note 23, at 70. Similarly, a National
Institute on Drug Abuse survey of high school seniors found that white youth reported using heroin
and cocaine at seven times the rate of African American youth, and a National Household Survey
on Drug Abuse found that white youth ages twelve to seventeen reported selling drugs a third more
frequently than African American youth. HOYTT, SCHIRALDI, SMITH & ZIEDENBERG, supra note
21, at 21. See also Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 20, at 104-05 (citing several sources for the
proposition that minority youth are disproportionately involved in violent criminal activities).
134. HoYTT, SCHIRALDI, SMITH & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 21, at 19.
135. See id. at 20-22.
136. See, e.g., DMC: 1969-1989 Review of Research, supra note 19, at 327-35, 527-42 (dis-
cussing how two-thirds of the studies of state and local juvenile justice systems reported a "race
effect" at some stage of the juvenile justice process that negatively affected outcomes for youth of
color); DMC: 1989-2001 REVIEW OF LITERATURE, supra note 19, at 5 (stating twenty-five of thirty-
four studies reviewed reported "race effects" in the processing of youth); Leiber, supra note 22, at
11-14, 26 app. D (showing thirty-two of forty-six studies conducted by forty different states re-
ported "race effects" in case outcomes).
137. DMC: 1969-1989 Review of Research, supra note 19.
138. DMC: 1989-2001 REVIEW OF LITERATURE, supra note 19.
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found no race effects. 139 Significantly, several of these studies have found that
legal and social factors cannot by themselves account for the disparities observed
in processing outcomes-in other words, but for the presence of race bias, over-
representation would not exist to the same degree. 140
Despite ample evidence that race affects juvenile justice decision-making,
however, studies attempting to document tangible evidence of intentional dis-
crimination have been inconclusive. 14 1  Instead, many researchers have con-
cluded that the race effects observed are likely the product of unconscious bias
or the use of decision-making criteria with strong racial correlates that differen-
tially disadvantage minority youth. 14 2 This theory is borne out in one study in
139. See id. at 5. One of the studies examined by Pope-a three-year quantitative analysis of
official juvenile intake records obtained from Florida's Department of Health and Human Services
conducted by sociologists Donna Bishop and Charles Frazier-is illustrative. See Bishop & Fra-
zier, supra note 84. From an examination of the delinquency processing records for nearly
140,000 Florida juveniles, Bishop and Frazier developed a profile of a "typical" juvenile processed
through the Florida justice system between 1985 and 1987: a fifteen-year-old male referred for a
misdemeanor against a person (such as simple battery), with a delinquency history consistent with
one prior referral for a misdemeanor against property (such as criminal mischief). Id. at 403. They
then calculated the predicted probability of a particular processing decision for white and non-
white youth with the values of other relevant variables, such as seriousness of current offense, at
their respective means. Id. According to the logistic regression results for formal processing out-
comes, the probability that a "typical" white juvenile would be formally processed in juvenile
court was 47%, while the probability that a non-white youth with the same characteristics would be
processed was 54%. Id. The results at other decision points were similar: the probability that a
"typical" white juvenile would be detained was 12%, compared with 16% for a "typical" non-
white juvenile. Id. A typical white juvenile adjudicated delinquent had a 9% probability of being
committed to a secure facility, compared to a 16% probability for a non-white juvenile. Id. at 404.
"While the magnitude of the race effect varies from stage to stage," Bishop and Frazier concluded,
"there is a consistent pattern of unequal treatment." Id.
140. See, e.g., Michael J. Leiber & Kristan C. Fox, Race and the Impact of Detention on Ju-
venile Justice Decision Making, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 470, 490 (2005) (finding, in a multi-
regression analysis of referrals made by an Iowa juvenile court between 1980 and 2000, that Afri-
can American youth were more likely to receive the more severe outcome at detention, initial ap-
pearance, and adjudication, "even controlling for relevant legal and [social] criteria and legal rep-
resentation"); DMC: 1969-1989 Review of Research, supra note 19, at 333 (finding that two-thirds
of forty-six studies reviewed reported substantial differences in the processing of minority youth
within many juvenile justice systems, which could not be attributed solely to the presence of legal
characteristics or other factors); DMC: 1989-2001 REVIEW OF LITERATURE, supra note 19, at 5
(finding that a majority of the thirty-four studies reviewed reported either direct or indirect "race
effects" in the processing of youth).
141. See Alan J. Tomkins, Andrew J. Slain, Marianne N. Hallihan & Cynthia E. Willis,
Subtle Discrimination in Juvenile Justice Decisionmaking: Social Scientific Perspectives and Ex-
planations, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1619, 1632-34 (1996) (citing numerous studies that resulted in
inconclusive outcomes regarding discrimination in the juvenile justice system).
142. See id. at 1634-35. See also Bishop & Frazier, supra note 84, at 412 (concluding that
"institutional racism" rather than "intentional race discrimination" likely accounted for the "clear
indications of race differentials in processing" observed in their Florida study); MICHAEL J. LEIBER,
THE CONTEXTS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE DECISION MAKING: WHEN RACE MATTERS (2003) (finding
that, in one Iowa juvenile court, a strong emphasis on parens patriae coupled with an influx of
multiple minority groups into the area and perceptions that such minority groups do not abide by
middle-class standards of dress, demeanor, marriage, and respect for authority led to different out-
comes for minority youth and white youth).
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particular. In an attempt to determine why African American youth in three
Washington state counties were receiving harsher sentencing recommendations
than white youth who were charged with the same crimes, sociologists George
Bridges and Sara Steen conducted a comprehensive analysis of 233 narrative
reports written by county probation officers. 143 After controlling for factors
such as age, gender, and offense history, Bridges and Steen observed that the
officers' written rationales for sentencing recommendations indicated that they
were more likely to attribute the criminal behavior of minority youth to "internal
forces," such as personal failure, inadequate moral character, and personality,
while attributing the criminal behavior of white youth to "external forces," such
as poor home life, lack of appropriate role models, and environment, even when
the objective risk factors associated with the youth were similar. 144 The offi-
cers' interpretations of subjective factors, such as the youth's level of remorse or
cooperativeness, Bridges and Steen found, ultimately led them to attribute the
delinquent behavior of minority youth to factors which could only be changed
through state intervention. 145 To illustrate their point, Bridges and Steen com-
pared the manner in which one probation officer depicted two seventeen-year-
old boys, Ed and Lou. Neither had a criminal history, and both were charged
with first-degree robbery. 146 Ed, however, was African American, while Lou
was white.
This robbery was very dangerous as Ed confronted the victim with a
loaded shotgun. He pointed it at the victim and demanded money be
placed in a paper bag .... There is an adult quality to this referral. In
talking with Ed, what was evident was the relaxed and open way he
discussed his lifestyle. There didn't seem to be any desire to change.
There was no expression of remorse from the young man. There was
no moral content to his comment.
Lou is the victim of a broken home. He is trying to be his own man,
but ... is seemingly easily misled and follows other delinquents against
his better judgment. Lou is a tall emaciated little boy who is terrified
by his present predicament. It appears that he is in need of drug/alcohol
evaluation and treatment. 147
Similarly, in their study of processing decisions in the Florida juvenile jus-
tice system, Bishop and Frazier observed that "in delinquency cases, black fam-
143. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile
Offenders: A ttributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. Soc. REv. 554 (1998).
144. Id. at 561-64.
145. Id. at 564-67.
146. Id. at 564.
147. Id.
Reprinted with the Permission of the New York University School of Law
[Vol. 32:285
2008] COMBATING THE COLOR-CODED CONFINEMENT OF KIDS 315
ily systems generally tend to be perceived in a more negative light."' 148 As one
juvenile court judge commented: "Inadequate family correlates with race and
ethnicity. It makes sense to put delinquent kids from these circumstances in
residential facilities."' 1
4 9
According to OJJDP, individual states report that racial stereotyping has
impacts on decision-making in their juvenile justice systems. In its 2002 update
on states' compliance with the DMC Mandate, OJJDP reported that eighteen
states "identified racial stereotyping and cultural insensitivity-both intentional
and unintentional-on the part of the police and others in the juvenile justice
system ... as important factors contributing to higher arrest rates, higher charg-
ing rates, and higher rates of detention and confinement of minority youth." 150
III.
EFFORTS TO REDUCE DMC IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. The Enactment of the DMC Mandate
On December 2, 2002, Jason "admitted" to the charge of trespassing. In
exchange, the probation officer and assistant district attorney handling his case
that day agreed to continue his case without a finding, a "cwof" in juvenile jus-
tice parlance, for six months. Most importantly, from Jason's perspective, he
wasn 't going back to lock-up.
The judge read aloud the conditions of Jason's probation: obey local, state,
and federal laws, report to your probation officer as directed, notify your proba-
tion officer immediately of a change of residence or employment, attend school
without incident, comply with a daily curfew of 7:30 p.m., complete six days of
community service, obey the rules of the home, and stay away from 455 Wash-
ington Street in Roxbury.
"Is mom here to take him home?" the judge asked when he was finished.
"He's DSS, Judge. His worker says he's got a shelter bed tonight and will
be going to a new placement tomorrow."
"All right. Good luck, son. "
When Congress enacted the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act (JJDPA) in 1974, its primary purposes were to remove juveniles from adult
jails and lockups, to achieve sight and sound separation of juveniles from adults
in jails, to remove status offenders who were merely in need of supervision from
the system altogether, and to develop a monitoring system to assure compliance
148. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 84, at 409.
149. Id. at 409-10.
150. HEIDI M. HSIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT 2002 UPDATE, at 12 (2002).
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with the objectives. 15 1 The legislation also established the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention and directed it to dispense monetary grants
to individual states and to monitor each state's compliance with the specific
mandates. 152
In 1987, the National Coalition of State Juvenile Justice Advisory Groups
issued a report entitled "An Act of Empowerment," which discussed the "special
problem of the treatment of minorities and American Natives caught up in the
juvenile justice system" and made recommendations for addressing the prob-
lem. 153 "Black, Hispanic and Native American youth are confined in jails and
institutions in numbers which far exceed their relative proportions in the general
population," the report lamented, statistics which "tell an ominous and tragic
story about the juvenile justice system in America." 154 Armed with this and
other recent reports addressing minority overrepresentation, 155 advocates lobbied
Congress to amend the JJDPA. One of the 1988 amendments to the JJDPA,
known as the "DMC Mandate," required states receiving funding from the Title
II, Part B, Formula Grants Program 156 to investigate the problem of "dispropor-
tionate minority confinement" in secure facilities and to develop action plans to
remedy the issues identified. 157 Specifically, if the proportion of a given group
of minority youth detained or confined in its secure detention facilities, secure
correctional facilities, jails, and lockups exceeded the proportion that group rep-
resented in the general population, the state in question was required to develop
and implement plans to reduce the disproportionate representation. 1
58
In 1992, presented with a series of new reports demonstrating that race
played a role in juvenile justice processing (including Pope and Feyerherm's
1990 report), Congress made the DMC Mandate a core requirement of the
JJDPA. 159 Under the 1992 language, states were required to: (1) identify the
151. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 102, 88
Stat. 1110-11 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5602 (2004)).
152. Id. § 204(a)-(j), 88 Stat. at 1112-13, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5614 (2004)).
153. NAT'L COALITION OF STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUPS, AN ACT OF
EMPOWERMENT 3 (1987).
154. Id. at 3-4.
155. See, e.g., Barry Krisberg, Ira Schwartz, Gideon Fishman, Zvi Eisikovits, Edna Guttman
& Karen Joe, The Incarceration of Minority Youth, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 173 (1987).
156. The Formula Grants Program makes federal funds available to states "to support State
and local programs that prevent juvenile involvement in delinquent behavior." 42 U.S.C. §
5602(1) (Supp. IV 2004). Under the Program, OJJDP determines the amount for which each state
is eligible using a formula based on the state's juvenile population. 28 C.F.R. § 31.301(a) (2006).
To be eligible for the program, a state must submit a comprehensive, three-year plan setting forth
the state's proposal for meeting the mandates and goals outlined in the JJDPA. 42 U.S.C. §
5633(a) (2000). The state's plan is amended annually to reflect new programming and initiatives
to be undertaken by the state and local units of government. Id.
157. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7258, 102 Stat. at 4439-40 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
5633(a)(22) (2000)).
158. Id.
159. Pub. L. No. 102-586, § 2(f)(3)(A)(ii), 106 Stat. 4982, 4993-94 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (Supp. IV 2004)).
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extent to which DMC exists, (2) assess the reasons for its existence, and (3) de-
velop intervention strategies to address the causes of DMC. 160 If states could
not "demonstrate a good faith effort to address DMC issues," they risked losing
25% of their federal juvenile justice funding; the remaining 75% was then to be
used to move them back into compliance. 161
In 2002, Congress again amended the JJDPA to require that states partici-
pating in the Formula Grants Program "address juvenile delinquency prevention
efforts and system improvement efforts designed to reduce, without establishing
or requiring numerical standards or quotas, the disproportionate number of juve-
nile members of minority groups, who come into contact with the juvenile jus-
tice system."' 16 2 This change broadened the concept of DMC from dispropor-
tionate minority "confinement" to disproportionate minority "contact" by
requiring an examination of possible disproportionate representation of minority
youth at all decision points along the juvenile justice system continuum. How-
ever, while Congress expanded the reach of the Mandate, it also relaxed its pen-
alty provisions. Instead of losing 25% and putting the remaining 75% toward
compliance, states would now lose just 20% and use 50% toward compliance. 163
B. The Limited Impact of the DMC Mandate
Jason was back in court six weeks later for violating his curfew andfailing
to "obey the rules of the home. " In mid-December, Jason had moved into his
biological mother's studio apartment in Roxbury. While their first week of co-
habitation had been relatively uneventful, things had deteriorated rapidly since.
During their most recent argument, his mother told him she wanted him out, and
he believed her. When he didn't return the next day, Jason's mother called his
probation officer, and a warrant issued for his arrest. He was picked up two
days later.
A third visit to the BJC meant a third lawyer. After interviewing Jason, his
lawyer pulled aside his supervising probation officer. By any measure, the pro-
bation officer was a veteran. He had spent more than a decade supervising
adults before requesting a transfer to juvenile court five years earlier. He
prided himself on being able to "read a kid" right away and "cut through the
bullshit. " He had Jason figured out, he told Jason's lawyer.
"Jason uses his past to try to get over, "he explained. "The stuff aboutfos-
ter care, the stuff with his mother, he knows that's going to get him sympathy
and he plays on it. It's how he operates. He 's playing you right now."
Jason's lawyer didn't bother to ask the probation officer what he was going
to recommend at Jason 's probation violation arraignment later that morning.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 12209(1)(P), 116 Stat. 1873, 1878 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2004)) (emphasis added).
163. 116 Stat. at 1879.
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While the DMC Mandate has played an important role in sensitizing states
to the issues of minority overrepresentation and systemic bias, 164 its overall im-
pact has been disappointing. Perhaps the most obvious indicator of this fact is
that, nearly twenty years after the Mandate was enacted, national DMC rates
have increased or remained stagnant overall. In its 2006 compilation of national
juvenile justice information and statistics, OJJDP concludes that "the racial pro-
file of delinquency cases overall was essentially the same in 1985 and 2002.
" 165
However, the report then goes on to state that, while the delinquency case rate
for white juveniles had an overall increase of 15% during this period, the delin-
quency case rate for African American juveniles had an overall increase of
27%.166 In 2002, "the delinquency case rate for blacks was more than twice the
rate for whites and just over three times the rate for youth of other races," OJJDP
confirms. 167 Similarly, while the detention rate for white juveniles had an over-
all increase of 32% between 1985 and 2002, the detention rate for African
American youth had an overall increase of 64%. 168 What is most notable about
these disparities is that they occurred during a period of overall decline in the
rate of violent crime committed by juveniles of color. In 2002, the national Vio-
lent Crime Index arrest rate for white youth was roughly the same as it was in
1988.169 The national Violent Crime Index arrest rate for African American
youth, however, had dropped 35%, the rate for Asian youth had dropped 23%,
and the rate for Native American youth had dropped 16%. 170
Blame for the relative ineffectiveness of the DMC Mandate can be assigned
at every level. During the last decade, even as study after study concluded that
DMC rates had not declined since the enactment of the Mandate, Congressional
support has waned. The most radical ebb occurred in the mid-1990s when the
Senate Judiciary Committee considered enacting the Violent and Repeat Juvenile
Offender Act of 1997.171 The bill proposed multiple "get tough" measures for
juvenile offenders, including a provision that lowered the minimum age for trial
of capital offenses from eighteen to sixteen and a provision that would have re-
pealed the DMC Mandate. 17 2 The 1997 bill was never put to a vote, but the
shootings at Columbine High School gave the proposal new life in 1999. The
proposed Consequences for Juvenile Offenders Act of 1999 again included mul-
tiple measures to make it easier for prosecutors to try children as adults and, like
164. See Leiber, supra note 22, at 14.
165. SNYDER & SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006, supra note 23, at 163.
166. Id. The discrepancy between these two figures might be even greater if Latino/a youth
were disaggregated from white youth.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 169.
169. Id. at 132. The rate had seen large increases in the interim.
170. Id. The arrest rates for all groups increased in the mid-1990s but decreased sharply over
a period of a few years.
171. S. 10, 105th Cong. (1997).
172. Id. §§ 103, 305.
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its predecessor, sought to repeal the DMC Mandate. 17 3 In the summer of 1999,
the bill passed in both the House and Senate. 174 Though it subsequently died in
conference, it failed only because of an attached provision strengthening firearm
laws. 17 5 In the end, while Congress was willing to abandon its commitment to
the philosophy of diminished capacity and the goal of achieving racial equality
in the justice system in order to get "tough on crime," it was not willing to adopt
laws that would make it more difficult for juveniles to obtain firearms.
More directly responsible for the Mandate's limited effectiveness, however,
has been OJJDP's lack of consistent oversight. In the most recent DMC Techni-
cal Assistance Manual, published by OJJDP to assist states in their efforts to im-
plement DMC-related programs, OJJDP reaffirms its duty to "diligently enforce
this core requirement by setting uniform standards in its annual determination of
states' DMC compliance status and unfailingly administering the consequences
of noncompliance as the JJDP Act specifies: i.e., by restricting the drawdown of
20 percent of that state's Formula Grant allocation in the subsequent year." 176
Since 1992, however, OJJDP has penalized states for non-compliance just three
times-twice in 2004 and once in 2005.177 As a result, compliance in many
states has been poor. As of 2002, fourteen years after the DMC Mandate was
enacted, eighteen states had yet to identify the factors contributing to DMC in
their communities.1 78 Moreover, according to OJJDP, those states that had taken
steps to address DMC had invested almost exclusively in programs aimed at
preventing minority delinquency, rather than initiatives to address the systemic
issues contributing to DMC. 179
173. H.R. 1501, 106th Cong. (1999).
174. 145 CONG. REC. H4476-H4573 (daily ed. June 17, 1999); 145 CONG. REc. S9450-59
(daily ed. July 28, 1999).
175. JoAnne O'Bryant, Edith Fairman Cooper & David Teasley, Juvenile Justice: Legislative
Activity and Funding Trends for Selected Programs, in JUVENILE CRIME: CURRENT ISSUES AND
BACKGROUND (Lawrence V. Moore ed., 2000).
176. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL, at Intro-2 to Intro-3 (3d ed. 2006), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/
dmc ta manual/dmcfull.pdf
177. Id. at 6-2. OJJDP's "judicious approach to implementation of DMC ... appears to fol-
low the 'spirit' of the mandate and attempts to make inroads-'to get something done' rather than
accomplishing 'nothing at all,"' University of Iowa Professor Michael Leiber has observed.
Leiber, supra note 22, at 16. "While the strategy may be a reasonable and wise response to the
political and economic realities of the implementation of legislation, it has come at the cost of
providing specific instruction, consistency in the determination of compliance, and an accurate
picture of DMC and its causes." Id.
178. HSIA, supra note 150, at 16. Until recently, two states, Maine and Vermont, were ex-
empt from the DMC requirement because their minority juvenile population did not exceed one
percent of the total state juvenile population, and South Dakota and Wyoming opted not to partici-
pate in the federal grant program. Id. at 11.
179. Id. at 17. OJJDP's assistance to states in their efforts to comply with the DMC Mandate
has plainly improved during the last few years. See Leiber, supra note 22, at 18. For example,
OJJDP has begun to provide more specific instruction to state juvenile justice advisory groups
through national and regional training conferences, technical assistance manuals, compliance
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As of 2002, fifty-five states and territories receive Formula Grant funding
through the JJDPA. 180 Though the quality of the data varied considerably from
state to state, a 2002 overview of data produced by forty-three states pursuant to
the "Identification Stage" of compliance indicated that minority youth were
overrepresented at every decision point in every state's juvenile justice sys-
tem. 18 1 Significantly, thirty-two of the studies found evidence of "race differ-
ences" in juvenile justice outcomes "that are not totally accounted for by differ-
ential involvement in crime." 182 Despite these findings, many states continue to
insist that DMC is the product of differential offending alone. 183 They have also
"exerted constant pressure on Congress to not include DMC in the reauthoriza-
tion of the [JJDPA] or, at a minimum, to 'water down' the DMC require-
ment." 
184
Massachusetts is one such state. In 2003, the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion issued a report entitled "Disproportionate Minority Confinement in Massa-
chusetts: Failures in Assessing and Addressing the Overrepresentation of Mi-
norities in the Massachusetts Juvenile Justice System" (the "ACLU Report"),
which concluded that, while the state had known for a decade that youth of color
were overrepresented at every decision-making point in its juvenile justice sys-
tem, Massachusetts had "taken no meaningful steps to address racial dispari-
ties." 185 According to the report, the state's juvenile justice advisory committee
(JJAC) had either failed or outright refused to comply with the Mandate, by,
among other things: filling nearly two-thirds of its seats with government em-
ployees; holding infrequent and closed meetings; relying on incomplete, errone-
ous, and, in one case, inapposite data regarding the existence and causes of
DMC; and failing to heed advice from DMC Intensive Technical Assistance
trainers.186 In spite of this, however, the state had continued to receive federal
funds through the JJDPA. 187 In fact, according to the report, "OJJDP audits re-
peatedly have found Massachusetts to be in compliance" with the DMC Man-
date, even though "almost none of the millions of federal dollars received by the
Commonwealth for youth-related programs (including juvenile delinquency ef-
forts) has been allocated to minority overrepresentation."' 188 Thus, fifteen years
after the DMC Mandate was enacted and eleven years after it became a core re-
checklists, and intensive, individualized technical assistance. Id. at 18-19.
180. Leiber, supra note 22, at 8.
181. Id. at 9-10.
182. Id. at 11.
183. Id. at 16.
184. Id.
185. DAHLBERG, supra note 28, at 1.
186. Id. at 5-13.
187. Id. at 12.
188. Id. at 1-2.
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quirement, Massachusetts had effectively done little to nothing to address DMC
in its juvenile justice system. 189
All of this is not to say that the DMC reduction measures laid out in the
Mandate cannot work. 19 0 In fact, what is most frustrating about the Massachu-
setts example is that several other localities have demonstrated that these meas-
ures can work. Multnomah County, Oregon, and Santa Cruz County, California,
for example, have seen DMC rates drop significantly since the enactment of the
DMC Mandate, through a combination of research, diversification of staff, out-
reach to families and community organizations, implementation of objective de-
cision-making tools, and development of new community-based alternatives to
detention. 19 1 The problem is simply that, except in a handful of places, there
appears to be little political urgency to implement them.
The relative ineffectiveness of race-conscious accountability legislation like
the DMC Mandate may be an inevitable consequence of relying on political
189. Since the publication of the ACLU Report, however, the Executive Office of Public
Safety, along with a number of local advocates, has participated in a strategic campaign to address
the Commonwealth's DMC problem. See Lael E.H. Chester, The Power of Paper: The Impact of
the ACLU's Report on the Overrepresentation of Minorities in Massachusetts' Juvenile Justice
System, in BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, No TURNING BACK: PROMISING APPROACHES TO
REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES AFFECTING YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
22, 27-30 (2005) (discussing the origins of the ACLU report and the efforts of local advocates to
spur the state into action). The JJAC has been almost entirely reconfigured with diverse and quali-
fied members, and the committee has made DMC reduction a "focus and priority of its work." Id.
at 29. Among other things, the JJAC has begun to hold regular juvenile justice detention forums
around the state, which are designed to provide an opportunity for juvenile justice stakeholders
(including juvenile court judges, juvenile probation officers, juvenile public defenders/bar advo-
cates, assistant district attorneys, mental health clinicians, human service providers, advocates,
police, and state youth service agencies) to discuss strategies to reduce the use of pre-adjudication
detention and the overrepresentation of minority youth in the Massachusetts juvenile justice system
generally. Id.
190. Nor is it to suggest that no one has taken a national leadership role in the fight against
DMC. In the late 1990s, the Youth Law Center, in collaboration with a coalition of organizations,
including the Communications Consortium Media Center, the Juvenile Law Center, Pretrial Ser-
vices Resource Center, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the Center on Juvenile &
Criminal Justice, Minorities in Law Enforcement, and the Center for Third World Organizing,
developed an initiative to "protect minority youth in the justice system" and "promote fair, rational
and effective juvenile justice policies." Called "Building Blocks for Youth," the initiative com-
bines research on the impact of adult-court transfer legislation in the states; assessment of the legal
and policy issues in privatization of juvenile justice facilities by for-profit corporations; analyses of
decision-making at critical points in the justice system; direct advocacy on behalf of minority
youth in the system, particularly with respect to conditions of confinement and effective legal rep-
resentation; constituency-building among African American and other minority organizations, as
well as religious, health, mental health, law enforcement, corrections, and business organizations at
the national, state, and local levels; and development of effective communications strategies to
provide timely and pertinent information to these constituencies. Building Blocks for Youth,
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org. The Annie E. Casey Foundation has also made DMC
reduction a priority, launching a multi-year initiative-Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative
(JDAI)-to cultivate alternatives to the use of detention in juvenile justice systems around the
country. See The Annie E. Casey Foundation, http://www.aecf.org.
191. See Eric Lotke & Vincent Schiraldi, The Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative: The
Santa Cruz and Portland Models, in No TURNING BACK, supra note 189, at 8, 9-15.
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processes to remedy a problem that afflicts a traditionally disfavored minor-
ity. 192 This hypothesis finds support in a 2002 analysis of the history of the
DMC Mandate offered by University of Iowa Professor Michael Leiber, who
notes that OJJDP has the unenviable task of pushing for change in a political
environment where there are countervailing political pressures.1 93 "[T]he poli-
tics of race, crime, and racial bias, coupled with state resistance and practical
considerations, led OJJDP to adopt a tentative approach to DMC," Leiber ob-
serves. 19 4 Professing agnosticism, as OJJDP seems to have done, or finessing
the issue by delay or obfuscation undoubtedly provides some political and legal
cover. Since the very purpose of the DMC Mandate is to root out and eradicate
institutional discrimination against minorities, it may very well be that apolitical
or counter-majoritarian institutions, of which courts are the obvious example, are
more appropriate guardians of the interests at stake.
19 5
IV.
BRINGING AN EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE TO THE
DISPROPORTIONATE PRETRIAL DETENTION OF CHILDREN OF COLOR
A. The McCleskey Hurdle
Jason returned to Metro Youth Services, but this time for just a week. The
judge had agreed to a "short date "for Jason's probation violation hearing with
the understanding that Jason's lawyer would be prepared to address both the
merits of the alleged violations and disposition.
Jason's lawyer met with him in detention. He was subdued, but more forth-
coming than he had been in court. He wasn't sure what to do about his mother.
"I barely even know her, " he reminded the lawyer. If it would help get him re-
leased, however, he would agree to try family counseling. As his lawyer stood
up from the table, Jason stopped her. "It's not like I'm trying to be committed,
you know. But it's like, if that's what you all got planned anyway, just get it over
with."
192. The problems with the implementation of the DMC Mandate may be analogous to the
difficulties disfavored minorities have protecting their rights in a democratic legislative process.
See COLE, supra note 31, at 139; Lawrence, supra note 38, at 347 (noting that groups in the "body
politic" may avoid coalition with blacks without a "conscious awareness of their aversion to
blacks").
193. Leiber, supra note 22, at 14-15. "The topic of race and, in particular, race bias gener-
ates much controversy," Leiber writes, "especially when many people still think of discrimination
only in terms of overt, blatant acts such as the Rodney King and Malice Green incidents." Id. at
15.
194. Id. at 19.
195. "The Court, an undemocratic institution at the heart of a democracy, is at its most le-
gitimate where it counteracts defects in the majoritarian process," observes Cole. COLE, supra note
31, at 139 (citing ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 31).
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The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from taking action that would
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." 19 6 His-
torically, this guarantee has applied equally to the enactment of laws by the leg-
islative branches 19 7 and the enforcement of those laws by members of the execu-
tive branches. 198 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, for example, evidence that municipal
authorities had systemically denied laundry operating permits to Chinese appli-
cants was sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court said:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal dis-
criminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution. 199
Whether driven by pragmatic, ideological, or perhaps even political con-
cerns about the potential reach of this rationale, the Supreme Court has over the
last thirty years taken pains to isolate Yick Wo as a response to an especially se-
vere example of disparate impact. The Court has promulgated standards that
have significantly limited the ability of petitioners to bring statistically based
equal protection claims as a means of redressing systemic discrimination, by re-
quiring proof that individual decision-makers intended to discriminate against
the named claimant. In doing so, the Court has largely confined effects-based
analysis to cases brought under statutory mandates, such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act.
200
The "intent" doctrine, as it has come to be known, was first articulated by
the Supreme Court in 1976 in Washington v. Davis.20 1 There, several black offi-
cers charged that the hiring and promotion policies used by the District of Co-
lumbia's police department discriminated against them in violation of the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment. 20 2 Specifically, they argued that
a written test developed by the Civil Service Commission and used by the
196. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
197. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
198. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
199. Id. at 373-74.
200. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (citing Civil Rights Act of
1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1991), and finding that employment qualification criteria that
disqualify black applicants at a substantially higher rate than white applicants and that do not have
a demonstrable relationship to successful job performance are violative of Title VII, without the
need to establish discriminatory motive); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (citing Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982), and finding that interlocking congressional districts with
majority African American and Latino populations formed in disregard of traditional redistricting
criteria and with shapes that were unexplainable on any ground other than race violated the Voting
Rights Act).
201. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
202. Id. at 232-33.
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department to measure verbal ability and reading comprehension had a dispro-
portionately adverse impact on African American applicants. 20 3
In its opinion, the Davis majority announced, for the first time, that the "ra-
cially differential impact" standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial
discrimination was "not the constitutional rule."20 4 To demonstrate an equal
protection violation, the Court held, claimants would have to show not only a
disparate impact but also a discriminatory purpose-something the Davis plain-
tiffs had not done. 20 5 The Court's opinion was plainly animated by its concern
that, once unleashed, an effects-based analysis of executive branch decision-
making would be hard to confine. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart
warned:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless inva-
lid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens
one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise seri-
ous questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, wel-
fare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more
burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more afflu-
ent white.206
One year later, in Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corporation, Justice Powell applied the rationale of Washington v.
Davis-that is, that the adverse racial impact of executive action alone is not
enough to establish the requisite intent to prove a constitutional violation-to
reverse a finding that a zoning change that effectively blocked the construction
of integrated housing violated the Equal Protection Clause. 20 7 Perhaps recogniz-
ing the Davis Court's failure to delineate how a petitioner could demonstrate the
requisite intent, the Court articulated for the first time what type of circumstan-
tial evidence would be sufficient to prove a discriminatory purpose.2°8 A plain-
tiff alleging unconstitutional discrimination need not prove that the govern-
ment's action rested "solely," or even "primarily" or "dominantly" on racially
discriminatory purposes, the Court explained; she must simply show that race
had been a "motivating factor in the decision." 20 9 Disproportionate impact,
while not dispositive, could provide an important starting point if supplemented
by other objective evidence. 210 This evidence included the historical back-
ground of the decision, the specific series of events leading up to the challenged
action, departures from the normal procedural sequence and substantive policies
203. Id. at 234-35.
204. Id. at 239.
205. Id. at 238-41.
206. Id. at 248.
207. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
208. Id. at 265-68.
209. Id. at 265-66.
210. Id.
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generally followed by the decision-maker, and the legislative and administrative
history of the action.2 1 1 Justice Powell was also careful to distinguish Yick Wo
and other cases where, he noted, the racial impact of the decision in question was
particularly "stark" or pronounced.2 12
While they did not address decision-making in the criminal justice context,
Davis and cases adopting its rationale laid the doctrinal foundation for what has
been called the most important decision on race and crime ever issued by the
Court.2 13 In 1978, Warren McCleskey was sentenced to death for killing a white
police officer during an armed robbery. 2 14 In support of his subsequent petition
for habeas corpus relief, McCleskey presented what remains one of the most
comprehensive statistical analyses ever conducted on the impact of race on capi-
tal sentencing. The so-called Baldus study, a highly sophisticated multiple re-
gression analysis of more than 2000 murder cases disposed of in the state of
Georgia between 1973 and 1979, concluded that prosecutors were more likely to
seek the death penalty and juries were more likely to impose the death penalty
when black defendants were convicted of killing white victims.2 15
Relying on the Baldus study, McCleskey argued that, because defendants
who were convicted of killing white victims were substantially more likely to
receive the death penalty than defendants convicted of killing black victims,
Georgia's capital sentencing system was administered in a racially discrimina-
tory manner in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 16 He argued that the Baldus study's findings compelled an infer-
ence that his own death sentence was the product of racial discrimination.2 17
The Court rejected McCleskey's challenge by a five-to-four margin. Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Powell, who joined in the opinion of the court in
Washington v. Davis and authored the Arlington Heights opinion, offered multi-
ple justifications for his ruling. First, he quickly considered and dismissed
McCleskey's argument that the Baldus study constituted proof that racial dis-
crimination had played a role in his sentence. 2 18 Whether or not other juries had
sentenced defendants to death more often for killing white victims than black
victims did not prove the jury in McCleskey's case had discriminated against
him on the basis of race, Justice Powell explained.2 19 Such proof would require
211. Id. at 267-68.
212. Id. at 266.
213. See COLE, supra note 31, at 137.
214. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 279 (1987).
215. Id. at 286-87.
216. Id. at 292-93. McCleskey also argued that the Baldus study demonstrated a constitu-
tionally impermissible risk that race had played a role in his death sentence in violation of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 308.
217. Id. at 292-93.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 292-97.
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direct evidence that either the prosecutor or jury in McCleskey's case was moti-
vated by racial bias-evidence that Justice Powell believed was lacking.
220
Acknowledging that the Court had accepted statistics as proof of intent to
discriminate "in certain limited contexts," Justice Powell concluded that the
Baldus study was nonetheless "clearly insufficient to support an inference that
any of the decision-makers in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory pur-
pose."221 While he did not dispute the validity of the study, Justice Powell ex-
plained that "the nature of the capital sentencing decision, and the relationship of
the [Baldus] statistics to that decision" precluded the Court from adopting an
inference that its findings could be applied to a single case.
222
He then went on to identify three "fundamental differen[ces]" between the
capital sentencing decision and the administrative decisions at issue in the two
areas where the Court had inferred intentional discrimination from statistical
evidence of disparate impact: jury venire cases brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment and employment cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. 223 First, Justice Powell explained, the application of statistics to a capital
sentencing decision is incomparable to the application of statistics to either a
jury venire or employment decision because a capital sentencing decision is
made by a petit jury that is selected from a "properly constituted venire,"
"unique in its composition," and required under the Constitution to consider "in-
numerable factors that vary according to the characteristics of the individual de-
fendant and the facts of the particular capital offense." 224 In the jury venire and
employment contexts, on the other hand, impact-oriented statistics reflect the
decisions of "fewer entities" and "few variables are relevant to the challenged
decision." 225  In effect, because jury venire and employment decisions were
made by repeat actors, he reasoned, "an unexplained statistical discrepancy can
220. Id. Professor David Cole expands on the irony of this standard in No Equal Justice.
COLE, supra note 31, at 135. Because criminal defendants are essentially barred from obtaining
discovery from either prosecutors or juries, they are effectively "precluded from discovering evi-
dence of intent from the two actors whose discriminatory intent the McCleskey Court required
them to establish," Cole remarks. Id.
221. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293, 297.
222. Id. at 294.
223. Id. at 293-97 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 n. 13 (1977)) ("[B]ecause of the nature of the jury-selection task... we have permitted a
finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern [of discrimination] does not
approach such extremes"); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (holding that a two-to-
one disparity between the numbers of Mexican Americans in county population and those sum-
moned for grand jury duty was sufficient to prove an equal protection violation in the absence of
any rebuttal); and Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-01 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(holding that multiple regression analysis demonstrating a pattern of salary disparities between
white and African American workers can be sufficient to prove statutory violations under Title
VII)).
224. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294.
225. Id. at 295.
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be said to indicate a consistent policy of the decisionmaker." 226 Conversely, the
Baldus study "seeks to deduce a state 'policy' by studying the combined effects
of the decisions of hundreds of juries that are unique in their composition." 22 7
Second, Justice Powell explained, unlike the criteria considered by jury
commissioners, which are "uniform for all potential jurors .. limited and, to a
great degree, objectively verifiable," and employers, which involve a "number of
relevant variables... [but] are to a great extent uniform for all employees," a
capital sentencing jury "may consider any factor relevant to the defendant's
background, character, and the offense." 2 28  And third, while the decision-
makers in the jury venire and employment contexts have "an opportunity to ex-
plain the statistical disparity" in question, "the State has no practical opportunity
to rebut the Baldus study."2 29 As a practical matter, the burden-shifting frame-
work simply would not work in the capital sentencing context, because the state
could not possibly know "the motives and influences that led to [the jury's] ver-
dict."'230 In other words, Justice Powell asked, how could the state be expected
to reconstruct and defend a decision-making process to which it was not even a
party?
Justice Powell then cited four pragmatic justifications for his decision.
First, he reasoned, McCleskey's constitutional challenge to decision-making in
the capital sentencing system was "antithetical to the fundamental role of discre-
tion" in the criminal justice system.23 1 To uphold McCleskey's challenge, Jus-
tice Powell implied, would be tantamount to stripping both prosecutors and ju-
ries of their ability to administer individualized justice. 232 Second, he reasoned,
there are statutory safeguards against the abuse of discretion in the sentencing
process. Seemingly without irony, Justice Powell cited to the revamping of
Georgia's capital sentencing laws in the wake of Furman v. Georgia2 33 as evi-
dence of these safeguards, without ever acknowledging that the Baldus study had
shown these prophylactic measures to be less than effective. 234 Justice Powell's
third justification is what Justice Brennan in dissent labeled the "fear of too
much justice." 235 If the Court were to uphold McCleskey's challenge, Justice
Powell cautioned, it would open the proverbial floodgates to a host of other
claims and claimants. 2 36 Justice Powell seemed to think that the criminal justice
226. Id. at 295 n.15.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 295 n.14.
229. Id. at 296.
230. Id. (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915)).
231. Id. at 311.
232. Id. at 311-12.
233. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
234. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 302-03.
235. See id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 314-18.
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system simply could not withstand such an onslaught. 237 In essence, he was res-
urrecting Justice Stewart's rationale in Washington v. Davis that a wholesale sta-
tistical examination of the racial consequences of applying seemingly neutral
statutory criteria to entire cohorts might threaten a wide variety of executive and
legislative practices. Finally, Justice Powell reasoned, the problem of remedying
the racial disparities evidenced by the Baldus study was one better left to the leg-
islature. 238 "It is the legislatures, the elected representatives of the people, that
are 'constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the
people. "'239
It is indisputable that McCleskey raises a serious hurdle to anyone challeng-
ing systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system on statistical grounds.
Since 1987, federal and states courts have relied on the stringent standard of
proof reaffirmed in McCleskey to protect a variety of institutional practices in the
criminal justice context that have had an undeniable and foreseeable impact on
people of color. 240 The result has been that, except in the extremely rare case in
which a government actor admits that he or she was motivated by race, success-
ful equal protection challenges to discretionary decisions in the criminal justice
arena are practically non-existent.
B. Why Juvenile Claimants Can Overcome the McCleskey Hurdle
At Jason's January 23, 2003, probation violation hearing, his probation of-
ficer summarized his recommendation in a single sentence: "Jason's just not
probation material. "
Jason's lawyer then addressed the court. How could the probation depart-
ment effectively write Jason off after just six weeks of supervision? He was liv-
ing with his mother for the first time in fourteen years-there was bound to be a
transition period. And Jason was doing relatively well with his other conditions.
"Maybe it's not that Jason isn't probation material," his lawyer concluded,
237. See id.
238. Id. at 319.
239. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
240. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) (finding that statistical
evidence showing defendants prosecuted on crack cocaine charges in federal court during a three-
year period were overwhelmingly African American was insufficient to demonstrate a basis for
discovery since defendants failed to identify any similarly situated white defendants who had been
prosecuted under the more lenient state court standard); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
362 (1991) (holding that defendant failed to prove purposeful discrimination despite evidence that
prosecutorial categories for juror removal (i.e., the likelihood that jurors would defer to an official
translation of Spanish-language testimony), necessarily led to the disproportionate removal of La-
tino jurors); United States v. Richardson, 130 F.3d 765, 781 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that statistical
disparities in sentencing are not sufficient to prove that Congress or the United States Sentencing
Commission adopted disparate crack/cocaine sentencing guidelines for the purpose of harming
African Americans); United States v. Andrade, 94 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1996) (same); Stevens v.
State, 456 S.E.2d 560, 562 (Ga. 1995) (holding that statistical disparities in Georgia prosecutors'
invocation of "Two Strikes and You're Out" law were not sufficient to establish threshold case of
discrimination).
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"maybe it's that we are placing expectations on Jason that are simply not realis-
tic. "
'7 wouldn't call requiring a young man to be respectful of his mother 'un-
realistic, "' the judge responded, leaning back in his chair, "but I understand
where you 're going, counsel. Let's do this. If he agrees to participate in family
counseling, and mom wants to take him home, we'll let him go. But I'm going to
extend his probation another six months. It's clear to me that he needs more, not
less, supervision."
McCleskey has been roundly criticized as legally flawed and, in at least one
instance, "morally reprehensible." 24 1 For an equal protection challenge to the
discriminatory pretrial detention of youth of color in the juvenile justice system
to succeed,242 however, McCleskey need not be frontally attacked. In fact, a
careful parsing of Justice Powell's reasoning in McCleskey suggests that the case
may actually be helpful to potential juvenile claimants. For several reasons,
which are discussed in detail below, the nature of juvenile detention decisions in
many jurisdictions places them squarely within the contours of the type of ad-
ministrative decisions for which, according to Justice Powell, evidence of dispa-
rate impact alone may be sufficient to create an inference of discriminatory in-
tent.
As Justice Powell acknowledged in McCleskey, the Supreme Court has his-
torically accepted statistical proof of discriminatory intent in certain contexts.
The most apposite of these for the purpose of assessing the viability of a dis-
criminatory pretrial detention claim is the jury venire selection process at issue in
Castaneda v. Partida,2 4 3 a case decided by the Court just months after
241. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 158
(1987).
242. To date, there have been few reported challenges to the discriminatory processing of
youth in the juvenile justice arena. One of the few reported decisions involving such a challenge is
State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 827 (N.C. 1998). In that case, the claimant alleged that North
Carolina's adult court transfer statute violated the federal and state Equal Protection Clauses be-
cause it "operated to transfer disproportionate numbers of black juvenile offenders to the superior
court." Id. at 602. However, while the claimant "present[ed] statistics showing that a significant
portion of the juveniles transferred to superior court [were] black," he failed to argue that the stat-
ute, as applied, operated to discriminate against him on a racial basis. Id. "Without such compari-
son," the court held, "defendant's statistics are meaningless" and failed to establish a prima facie
showing of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
243. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). As discussed in Part IV.A, supra, Justice
Powell also acknowledged that the Court has accepted multiple-regression analysis statistics to
prove statutory violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293-97,
(citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-01 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part)). While
Title VII jurisprudence is plainly relevant to the application of the impact-inference standard, the
Supreme Court has deemed it inapposite to the application of the "constitutional" equal protection
standard, which requires a showing of discriminatory purpose. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. at 238-39 ("We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of
invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII"). See also
Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 638 n.8 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the Title VII pattern
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Arlington Heights. In Castaneda, the Court held that statistics showing that
Mexican Americans were underrepresented on grand juries in Hidalgo County,
Texas, were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimina-
tion in grand jury selection. 244 Under Texas's "key man" system for selecting
grand juries, three to five jury commissioners or "key men" were appointed by a
state district judge to select between fifteen and twenty prospective jurors from
different portions of the county. 245 Prospective jurors were then summonsed to
court and the state district judge "test[ed] their qualifications" under oath.2 4 6
According to Texas law, qualified candidates had to be citizens of Texas and the
county, qualified voters in the county, "of sound mind and good moral charac-
ter," literate, have no prior felony conviction, and be under no pending indict-
ment or legal accusation for theft or any felony. 247 In support of his claim that
the "key man" system was administered in Hidalgo County in a discriminatory
manner, the defendant presented census and grand jury records which showed
that Mexican Americans were grossly underrepresented among those selected for
grand jury service. 24 8
Distinguishing the jury selection context from Davis and Arlington Heights,
the Court said that, in order to prevail on a claim of discriminatory grand jury
selection, a claimant would have to show that "the procedure employed resulted
in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to
which he belongs." 249 The Court then went on to articulate a three-pronged in-
quiry. A prima facie case of discriminatory purpose in grand jury selection is
demonstrated, the Court held, where the defendant establishes that: (1) the group
to which he belongs is a "recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different
treatment under the laws, as written or as applied"; (2) the group has been under-
represented in the grand jury process, demonstrated by "comparing the propor-
tion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand
jurors, over a significant period of time"; and (3) "a selection procedure that is
susceptible of abuse... supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the
statistical showing." 250 Once evidence of disparate impact is shown and is cou-
pled with evidence of excessive discretion in the administration of a jury selec-
tion procedure, the Court explained, the decision-maker must put forth race-
neutral reasons for the decision.251 If the decision-maker fails to provide an ade-
and practice analysis is only relevant to statutory schemes). For this reason, this analysis will fo-
cus solely on cases arising in the jury venire context.
244. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494-95.
245. Id. at 484.
246. Id. at 484-85.
247. Id. (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 19.08).
248. Id. at 486-87.
249. Id. at 494.
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. Id.
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quate explanation, the Court can allow the inference of discriminatory purpose to
stand.2
5 2
Applying this scheme to the facts in Castaneda, the Court found that Mexi-
can Americans were "a clearly identifiable class" subject to various social "dis-
advantages."253 The Court also found that the statistical evidence presented-
over an eleven-year period, only 39% of those summoned for grand jury service
were Mexican Americans in a county that was 79% Mexican American-was
enough to give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. 25 4 However, the
inference was further bolstered, Justice Blackmun explained, by the fact that the
Texas system of selecting grand jurors "is susceptible of abuse as applied. '2 55
Specifically, he noted, even though the Texas key man system was facially con-
stitutional, it was nevertheless susceptible of abuse "as applied" because it was,
among other things, "highly subjective." 25 6 Based upon this evidence, the bur-
den of proof shifted to the state to explain its selection of the jurors in the chal-
lenger's case on race-neutral grounds. Because the state offered no evidence
either attacking the reliability of the statistics or rebutting the inference of dis-
crimination, the Court concluded that the selection process was racially dis-
criminatory and affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit.257 Justice Stewart, the
author of Washington v. Davis, and Justice Powell, the author of Arlington
Heights, dissented. Ironically, Justice Powell would rely heavily on Castaneda a
decade later to ward off Warren McCleskey's challenge.
In every critical respect, juvenile court pretrial detention decisions in many
jurisdictions are analogous to the jury venire decision at issue in Castaneda, as
characterized by both Justice Blackmun and later Justice Powell himself, and are
distinguishable from the capital sentencing decision at issue in McCleskey. First,
like the jury commissioners and district judges under the Texas key man system,
juvenile justice decision-makers are not an ad hoc collection of private citizens
called together to form a petit jury but are repeat actors-professionally trained
judges and administrators whose decisions in hundreds of cases over time can be
examined for their statistical effects. 25 8  Second, notwithstanding the Schall
252. Id.
253. Id. at 495.
254. Id. at 495-96.
255. Id. at 497.
256. Id. (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954) (noting that, while "the
Texas system of selecting grand and petit jurors by the use of jury commissions is fair on its face
and capable of being utilized without discrimination .. it is susceptible to abuse and can be em-
ployed in a discriminatory manner")).
257. Id. at 501.
258. This characteristic of detention decision-making was evident in a recent Florida case, for
example, where the appellate court noted that it was, for the sixth time in a two-month span, grant-
ing an emergency habeas corpus petition "filed against this same [juvenile court] judge" for failure
to comply with the state detention statute and it hoped that "the message to this trial court judge
should be clear that he, too, must follow the law." R.G. v. State, 817 So.2d 1019 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding that juvenile is entitled to release from detention where court did not conduct
risk assessment procedure required by state statute).
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Court's affirmation in 1984 that a decision-maker need demonstrate only that a
prospective detainee poses a "serious risk" of reoffending, most modem juvenile
detention statutes require decision-makers to assess multiple offense- and of-
fender-related criteria. While these criteria are often highly subjective, the fact
that they are prescribed and uniform for all potential detainees likens them to the
criteria considered by jury commissioners and district judges under the key man
system and renders the entire decision-making process more susceptible to scru-
tiny than the loosely constrained capital sentencing decisions.259 Thus, unlike
the capital sentencing decisions of petit juries, which, Justice Powell empha-
sized, were case-specific and unverifiable, individual pretrial detention decisions
can be measured against one another. Finally, like the jury commissioners and
state district judges under the Texas key man system, and unlike the petit jurors
in McCleskey, repeat actors in the juvenile justice system may be called upon to
explain any statistical disparities produced by their detention decisions or rec-
ommendations. By the McCleskey Court's own reasoning, then, an equal protec-
tion challenge to the discriminatory pretrial detention of youth of color in the
juvenile justice system should be analyzed under the Castaneda three-pronged
inquiry: a claimant would create an inference of discriminatory intent if she
could demonstrate that she was a member of a historically disadvantaged class
that has been overrepresented in the population of juveniles detained by the
judge or probation officer in question over a significant period of time.260
Significantly, at least one court has invoked such a reading of McCleskey.
In Commonwealth v. Lora, a Massachusetts defendant presented various forms
of statistical evidence, including an analysis of the racial demographics of all
motor stops conducted by his arresting officers over a period of months, to sup-
port his claim that the officers' decision to stop and search his vehicle consti-
tuted a discriminatory application of facially neutral laws in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. 26 1 Citing McCleskey, the trial court held that the de-
259. For example, the Texas Family Code provides that a juvenile must be released after a
detention hearing is held, "unless the judge finds that the child: is likely to abscond; lacks adequate
supervision; lacks a parent or other person to return him or her to court when required; is a danger
to himself or may threaten the public safety; or was previously adjudicated for delinquent conduct
and is likely to commit an offense if released ... " TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.01(e) (West 2002).
260. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 497 (citing Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479).
261. Commonwealth v. Lora, No. 20020314, 2003 WL 22350945 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 12,
2003). The defendant also produced an analysis of the racial demographics of twenty motor stops
conducted by troopers from the officers' barracks during the relevant period, the racial demograph-
ics of the county in question, and a newspaper article on racial profiling in traffic stops that ranked
Massachusetts towns by disparity in minority searches. Among other things, the statistics revealed
that, while the town of Auburn is 97.5% white, 1% African American, and 0.6% Latino, of the 252
total stops the first officer made between August 2001 and February 2002 in Auburn, 54.9% in-
volved Caucasian operators, 31.3% involved Latino operators, and 11.76% involved African
American operators. While non-inventory searches occurred in 5.1% of the officer's stops of Cau-
casian operators, they occurred in 20.1% of the stops of Latino operators and 12.5% of the stops of
African American operators. Statistics involving the second trooper were even starker: while non-
inventory searches occurred in 1.9% of his stops of Caucasian operators, they occurred in 28% of
the stops of Latino operators and 41.67% of the stops of African American operators.
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fendant could rely on statistical evidence of discrimination to demonstrate intent
if the arresting officers' decisions could be analogized to the decisions at issue in
the two contexts where the Supreme Court "has accepted less-extreme statistical
patterns" of discrimination-jury venire and Title VII.2 62 Specifically, the court
explained, the defendant would need to show that the variables relied upon by
the arresting officers were:
objective; . few in number; the statistics relate[d] to a small number
of entities; the sample focuse[d] on decisions made by individuals
rather than on decisions made by departments or branches of govern-
ment; the decision maker ha[d] an opportunity to explain the statistical
disparity; and the court [was] in a position to assess both the credibility
of the data and the decision maker.26 3
Because the scrutinized decisions met those criteria, the Castaneda burden-
shifting framework could be properly applied.26 4 While it does not involve an
institutional processing decision, what Lora suggests is that courts may be will-
ing to read McCleskey as sanctioning the use of statistical evidence of intent
when the decisions in question can be distinguished from the capital sentencing
decision and readily analogized to the jury venire decisions at issue in Casta-
neda. Plainly, the pretrial detention decisions made by officials in many juris-
dictions fit this mold.
What may prove more challenging, however, is demonstrating that a par-
ticular detention decision-making process is susceptible of abuse in the wake of
Schall v. Martin. As discussed in Part I.A, supra, Schall held that even the most
general preventive detention statutes may comport with due process so long as
the detention order serves a legitimate state objective and is rendered pursuant to
a process that affords other procedural protections. 265 While Schall presents a
hurdle for discriminatory pretrial detention claimants, it is certainly not insur-
mountable. As the Court has acknowledged, a procedure need not violate the
Due Process Clause for it to be "susceptible of abuse." 266 Indeed, Justice Mar-
shall observed in dissent in Schall, it was the idiosyncratic practices of the judi-
cial decision-makers, rather than the content of the statute they were applying,
that were most responsible for inequitable and arbitrary detention outcomes. 2 6 7
The same reasoning applies in the pretrial detention context. The detention stat-
ute in question need not be found facially unconstitutional for the procedure
262. Id. at *11 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987)).
263. Id. at *13.
264. Id.
265. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256-57, 263 (1984).
266. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 (1977).
267. Schall, 467 U.S. at 303 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Not surprisingly, in view of the lack
of directions provided by the statute, different judges have adopted different ways of estimating the
chances whether a juvenile will misbehave in the near future."). Indeed, the Schall majority itself
admitted that, irrespective of its statutory constitutionality, "It may be, of course, that in some cir-
cumstances detention of a juvenile would not pass constitutional muster." Id. at 273.
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pursuant to which it is administered to be deemed susceptible of abuse. Rather it
is often the corresponding lack of regularity and oversight in the application and
administration of detention statutes, rather than the content of the statutes them-
selves, that renders the process susceptible of abuse 268 and, in some cases, dis-
criminatory-a finding that is not foreclosed by Schall.
Apart from the factual distinctions between the nature of the decision at is-
sue in McCleskey and that at issue at the pretrial detention stage, the inherent
differences between the aims of the juvenile justice system and the adult criminal
system also argue for greater latitude in applying statistical analysis as a refor-
mative tool. That juveniles are "different" from adults is a concept that is em-
bedded in our laws. "[C]hildren have a very special place in life which law
should reflect," Justice Frankfurter observed a half century ago. "Legal theories
and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncriti-
cally transferred to determination of a state's duty towards children." 269 As a
result, courts at every level have consistently considered the developmental dif-
ferences of adolescence in defining the scope of juveniles' constitutional
rights. 270 Three years ago, Justice Kennedy observed that the inherent neuro-
logical and sociological differences between children and adults "render suspect
any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders," in the majority
opinion declaring the death penalty unconstitutional when applied to juveniles
under the age of eighteen.271 "From a moral standpoint," he concluded, "it
would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be re-
formed. '272 Evoking the century-old Progressive philosophy that spurred the
creation of a separate justice system for children, Justice Kennedy's observations
underscore the persistent reality that the juvenile justice system continues to be
guided by a welfare-oriented ideology not found in the criminal justice system.
It is this fundamental distinction between the two systems that makes a challenge
to the selective pretrial detention of youth of color less likely to run afoul of the
four pragmatic concerns cited by Justice Powell in McCleskey: the potential in-
fringement on discretionary decision-making, the pre-existence of anti-bias pro-
phylactic measures, the "slippery slope" rationale, and the risk of usurping the
role of the legislature.
In McCleskey, Justice Powell warned that a finding for the petitioner would
268. See Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 7, at 91 (arguing that "[d]espite statutes
and rules, juvenile court judges make discretionary decisions effectively unconstrained by the rule
of law").
269. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
270. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (Powell, J.) ("[Y]outh is
more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most sus-
ceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial
recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible
than adults.") (footnotes omitted).
271. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
272. Id.
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"be antithetical to the fundamental role of discretion in our criminal justice sys-
tem."27 3 As an initial matter, whether applied in the context of criminal or juve-
nile justice, this logic is simply flawed. As Justice Brennan observes in dissent,
"discretion is a means" of achieving individualized justice, "not an end."'2 74 Evi-
dence that "race more likely than not plays ... a role" in decision-making neces-
sarily means that "the very end that discretion is designed to serve is being un-
dermined" and that individualized justice is not in fact being dispensed.2 75 This
reality is all the more problematic in the juvenile justice context, where the dis-
semination of individualized justice is not an adjunct value in the system-it is
the stated purpose of the system.
Nor is the presence of "safeguards designed to minimize race bias" in the
juvenile justice system a basis for rejecting a potential selective-processing
claim. As the system is presently configured, three of the most important consti-
tutional safeguards against race bias in the administration of justice are absent.
Indeed, a strong argument can be made that a discriminatory detention claim
should prevail in order to force the adoption of additional prophylactic measures.
Third, the law's recognition that juveniles are different minimizes what Jus-
tice Brennan called in dissent the "fear of too much justice." 276 The features of
the juvenile justice system that render it susceptible to an equal protection at-
tack-the lack of procedural safeguards, the emphasis on social factors, and the
corresponding lack of visibility, accountability, and oversight-are, for the most
part, unique to that institution. From a pragmatic perspective, this would enable
opponents of wide-spread change to argue that a successful disproportionate pre-
trial detention challenge should be restricted to its context: juvenile justice deci-
sion-making. And from a political perspective, the prospect of unlocking the
jailhouse doors would be far more palatable if those emerging were children.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that, while the phenomenon of minority
overrepresentation plainly exists in the criminal justice system,27 7 Congress has
never seen fit to address it.
Finally, the notion that solving the problem of race bias in the juvenile jus-
tice system is better left for the legislature is far less persuasive in the juvenile
justice context, where targeted legislation that has been in effect for more than
fifteen years has yielded only marginal results. In fact, an argument can be made
that the intermittent congressional support, the lax oversight, and the bureau-
cratic intransigence encountered by the DMC Mandate are themselves the
273. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987).
274. Id. at 336. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
275. Id.
276. See id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
277. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 29 (1995) (stating that African Americans make up approximately 13% of the population
in the United States but more than half of those incarcerated "in recent years").
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products of majoritarian "process defects" worthy of correction through judicial
intervention.
278
C. The Disproportionate Pretrial Detention Claim in Practice
Though Jason went home with his mother on January 23, he was back in
court three months later, this time for a new arrest. An argument with a class-
mate at Madison Park High School had erupted into a fight, and both boys were
charged with assault and battery and disturbing a public assembly.
This time Jason knew what to expect, and he began talking before his lawyer
could even ask for his name and address. "I'd rather take a commitment and be
done with it, "Jason told his lawyer through the holding cell door. "At least that
way I'd know where I'd be. No more back and forth between here, detention, my
mom's house. "
"Hold on, hold on," his lawyer interrupted. He started to explain that
commitment was by no means a foregone conclusion. That Jason's charges
weren't that serious. That there was a lot more the court could do before getting
to commitment. But Jason stopped him. "Look, it's what's going to happen.
Maybe not today, but it will happen. It's what they want to do. So, okay. Let's
start it right now and get it over with."
An equal protection challenge to the disproportionate pretrial detention of
juveniles of color could be raised either "defensively" or "offensively." 279 In the
context of the delinquency proceeding itself, a juvenile defendant could seek to
reverse the juvenile court's detention order through an emergency petition for
writ of habeas corpus280 or through a statutorily mandated process for appealing
the detention order.281 The claim could also be raised on behalf of an individual
claimant or a class of claimants through an action seeking declaratory relief and
an injunction against the juvenile court's continued application of the detention
278. See generally ELY, supra note 31. In Democracy and Distrust, Ely argues that the Free
Speech, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses should be read most aggressively when legisla-
tive majorities lock out minorities from political power or adopt policies reflecting social preju-
dice. Id. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005) (discussing the applica-
tion of Ely's representation reinforcement theory).
279. See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforce-
ment Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247
(1988) (discussing the relative value as deterrents of "offensive" versus "defensive" constitutional
remedies).
280. See, e.g., A.S. v. Byrd, 777 So.2d 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (granting habeas cor-
pus petition releasing juvenile from home detention when no risk assessment was prepared by the
Department of Juvenile Justice as required by statute). But see M.B. v. State, 905 S.W.2d 344
(Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (denying that habeas corpus is available for relief when there is a statutory
direct appeal procedure in which to raise claim); Luchene v. Wagner, 465 N.E.2d 395 (Ohio 1984)
(noting that habeas corpus relief is not a substitute when appeal is available).
281. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58 (laying out the procedure for appealing deten-
tion decisions and bail orders to state superior court).
Reprinted with the Permission of the New York University School of Law
[Vol. 32:285
2008] COMBATING THE COLOR-CODED CONFINEMENT OF KIDS 337
procedure in question.282 The obvious advantage of an "offensive" action is its
potential to provide an institutional remedy-one which benefits not only the
individual claimant but also other similarly situated juveniles, by deterring sys-
tem actors from committing repeated constitutional violations. 28 3 The difficulty,
however, is in convincing a court to grant relief that is likely to be both legally
and politically controversial.2 84
282. See, e.g., NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1045 (6th Cir. 1977) (affirm-
ing district court's authority to enjoin school board from enforcing resolutions that would rescind a
voluntary cluster-school desegregation plan and ordering that the cluster plan remain in effect until
final remedy approved); Pamela B. v. Ment, 709 A.2d 1089 (Conn. 1998) (affirming trial court's
authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of mother and potential class of par-
ents, compelling chief court administrator to establish new court procedures for temporary custody
order hearings).
283. See Meltzer, supra note 279, at 250 (arguing that when plaintiff seeks a deterrent rem-
edy, she acts as a "private attorney general, seeking relief to benefit the community at large rather
than to prevent harm that he personally is likely to suffer"). See also Note, Gideon's Promise Un-
fulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 HARv. L. REV. 2062, 2069-74
(2000) (noting that the relatively few attempts to improve the quality of indigent defense counsel
through institutional lawsuits have led to "significant and far-reaching reforms" and citing State v.
Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993); and State v. Lynch,
796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990)). See generally OWEN Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 18, 86-90
(1978) (advocating the use of injunctive relief in civil rights cases).
284. The propriety of "institutional reform litigation," as it is sometimes called, has long been
debated. Among the pragmatic concerns raised by both courts and commentators are the vesting of
"unreviewable discretion" in the hands of judges who are often required to fashion remedies that
account for non-legal interests, see Meltzer, supra note 279, at 320; William A. Fletcher, The Dis-
cretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 653-54
(1982) (noting that courts are hesitant to impose court-originated remedies in both prison and
school suits because they would be choosing among permissible solutions to non-legal polycentric
problems), and the ability of courts to undertake the long-term supervisory role often necessitated
by structural relief, see generally Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litiga-
tion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428 (1977); Fletcher, supra, at 648-49; but see Note, supra note 283, at
2072 (observing that judges are well-equipped to exercise supervisory authority over their own
institutions). From a legal perspective, suits seeking institutional reform through equitable relief
encounter problems of standing, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975) (plaintiffs
alleging a "'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
citizens" lack Article III standing); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (finding that
a victim of police choke hold who failed to demonstrate likelihood that he would be subject to
choke hold in the future lacked standing), the availability of an adequate remedy at law, see
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-502 (1974) (denying injunctive relief for alleged racial
discrimination by judicial officers when plaintiffs had available various federal and state remedies,
including the right to a substitution of judge or a change of venue, review on direct appeal or on
post-conviction collateral review, and the opportunity to demonstrate that the conduct of these
judicial officers is so prejudicial to the administration of justice that available disciplinary proceed-
ings were inadequate), the doctrine of "unclean hands," see, e.g., Pon v. Wittman, 81 P. 984 (Cal.
1905) (refusing to grant injunction that was sought against picketers to protect a prostitution busi-
ness), and the purported lack of an irreparable injury that is "both great and immediate," Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (holding that a defendant was not entitled to federal court equita-
ble relief against state court prosecution absent a showing that irreparable harm to him would be
both "great and immediate"). See also 13 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 609, § 4 (2006) (citing to
"a divergence of opinion with respect to the propriety of granting injunctive relief against dis-
criminatory prosecution" and noting that courts denying injunctive relief "have sometimes ex-
pressed the fear that if one person is granted an injunction against discriminatory enforcement of a
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To prevail in any context, a claimant would have to make a prima facie
showing that the detention classification procedure utilized by the juvenile court
in ordering her detention subjects youth of her race to substantially disparate
treatment and is "susceptible of abuse." 285 She would do this through a statisti-
cal analysis demonstrating that youth of her race are overrepresented in the rele-
vant subsection of the detention population in the jurisdiction in question (or,
depending on the availability of statistics, by courts in the county in question)
and that the level of overrepresentation is statistically significant, meaning that
the probability that it arose through chance is very slight.28 6 This analysis would
necessarily take the form of a sophisticated, multiple-regression study of the pre-
trial detention decisions made by the juvenile court in question (or, more
broadly, by juvenile courts in the relevant jurisdiction) over a period of time. 28 7
The claimant would attempt to bolster this statistical evidence of discriminatory
impact with circumstantial evidence of the type that the Supreme Court has
deemed probative of discriminatory intent in Arlington Heights and subsequent
cases. 288 For example, a juvenile raising a disproportionate pretrial detention
claim in Massachusetts could present evidence relating to the state's historical
failure to undertake efforts to reduce DMC in its juvenile justice system;28 9 the
criminal law or ordinance, others will seek the same relief, and the authorities will effectively be
prevented from ever enforcing an otherwise valid law").
285. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 478-79 (1954)). Specifically, she would need to demonstrate that: (1) the group to which the
claimant belongs is a "recognizable, distinct" group; (2) such group has been subject to "different
treatment" under the detention process in question, as written or as applied; and (3) the detention
process in question is susceptible of abuse. Id. See also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608
n.10 (1985) (applying Castaneda framework in challenge to prosecutor's allegedly selective en-
forcement of criminal sanction). This, of course, assumes that the court has already been per-
suaded, via the analysis laid out in Part IV.B, supra, to apply the Castaneda burden-shifting
framework to the claimant's petition.
286. As Justice Blackmun explained in Castaneda, "[tihe idea behind the rule of exclusion is
not at all complex. If a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it is due solely to
chance or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one must conclude that racial
or other class-related factors entered into the selection process." Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494 n.13
(citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.13 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 587 (1958);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131 (1940)).
287. Obviously, the most compelling analyses would demonstrate not just that juveniles of
color are substantially overrepresented in the relevant subsection of detainees, but also that the race
of the detainee has a statistically significant effect on detention outcomes.
288. This circumstantial evidence includes: (1) "the historical background of the decision,"
(2) "the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision," (3) "[d]epartures from
the normal procedural sequence," as well as substantive departures, (4) "the legislative or adminis-
trative history" of the procedure, Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-68 (laying out the foregoing
four factors), (5) the foreseeability of the discriminatory impact of the detention procedure, Co-
lumbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979), (6) knowledge of the discriminatory
impact of the detention procedure, see NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1051 (6th
Cir. 1977), and (7) the availability of less-discriminatory alternatives, see United States v. Bd. of
Sch. Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 573 F.2d 400, 413 (7th Cir. 1978).
289. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267 (citing Griffin v. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964)
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foreseeability of the discriminatory impact of the detention classification proce-
dure in question, as evidenced by prior studies demonstrating that youth of color
were overrepresented in the detention population created through use of the pro-
cedure; 2 90 and the availability of less-discriminatory alternatives to such proce-
dure, such as the Risk Assessment Instruments now utilized in other states to
classify detainees. 29 1 Finally, the claimant would present evidence that the de-
tention classification process in question is "susceptible of abuse." 292 In most
jurisdictions, a claimant would likely present circumstantial evidence regarding,
among other things, the lack of administrative guidelines and oversight govern-
ing the detention decision-making process in question.
293
If a claimant were able to establish such a prima facie case of disproportion-
ate pretrial detention, the burden would then shift to the prosecution (or, in an
offensive suit, the state attorney general or other designee) to demonstrate that
"legitimate racially neutral criteria and procedures" produced the racially dispa-
rate result.294 While courts have historically shown deference to the state's prof-
fered explanations in the jury selection context, 29 5 they have been less willing to
(holding that evidence detailing county's decade-long resistance to desegregating its public schools
was probative of discriminatory intent)). Specifically, a Massachusetts claimant could cite to the
ACLU Report, which provides a detailed summary of the state's failure for more than a decade to
comply with the DMC Mandate despite its awareness that children of color were vastly overrepre-
sented at various processing points in its justice system. See supra text accompanying notes 185-
89.
290. See, e.g., Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d at 1051 (holding that where foreseeable and
actual result of public officials' action or inaction was to increase racial identifiability of schools
with large minority enrollments, continuation of policy gives rise to the presumption of segregative
intent); Penick, 443 U.S. at 464-65 (holding that evidence that the perpetuation of segregation was
a foreseeable consequence of board's practices and policies was relevant to prove the ultimate fact
of forbidden purpose).
291. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 573 F.2d at 413 (holding that fact that government
ignored less segregative options which would have furthered its policies as effectively as chal-
lenged option is sufficient for a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent). For example, a
claimant could present research documenting the effectiveness of Risk Assessment Instruments
(RAIs) in reducing DMC, see HoYTT, SCHIRALDI, SMITH & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 21, at 54-62
(describing one county's use of an RAI to reduce DMC), and evidence regarding the availability of
federal technical assistance for implementing RAIs, see DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY
CONFINEMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 176.
292. In order to make this showing, a claimant would have to demonstrate that the procedure
was capable of being applied in such a manner as "practically to proscribe any group thought by
the law's administrators to be undesirable," Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1940), or that it
"provided a clear and easy opportunity for racial discrimination," Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625, 630 (1972).
293. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170-71 (1972) ("Where
... there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion ... the scheme permits and en-
courages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law.").
294. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 n. 19 (1977) (noting that mere protestations
of lack of discriminatory intent and affirmations of good faith will not suffice to rebut the prima
facie case). Accord Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986) ("The State cannot meet this bur-
den on mere general assertions that its officials did not discriminate or that they properly per-
formed their official duties.").
295. See, e.g., United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1993) (permitting
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do so when presented with compelling statistical evidence of disparate impact in
procedures administered by state actors, such as judges or prosecutors, along
with evidence that the procedures in question provided such actors with an "op-
portunity" to discriminate.296 In other words, the stronger the prima facie case-
both statistically and circumstantially-the less likely it is that the state will
mount a successful rebuttal. Even if the state were to succeed in rebutting the
prima facie case, however, the very act of doing so would likely require the tes-
timony of system professionals and the production of data and documents re-
garding the guidelines and practices that govern their processing decisions. This
exercise itself would raise consciousness of the problem of DMC both within the
juvenile court system and in the public eye, which in turn could lead to self-
correcting measures even if the challenge itself failed to result in mandatory re-
lief to the claimant. 297
If the state were to fail to rebut the claimant's case, the court would have
wide discretion to impose remedies.298 The narrowest remedy would be a re-
peremptory challenges to jurors with Hawaiian surnames for reasons such as lack of attentiveness,
financial hardship, and having long hair and a beard). See also Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights and
Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2001, 2021 & nn.96-101 (1998) (discussing
courts' acceptance of proffered explanations such as weight, handwriting, clothing, and attitude).
296. See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 560, 562 (1953) (rejecting state's rebuttal to
prima facie showing of discrimination in jury venire when the race of the members of the jury pool
was identifiable through the use of different colored tickets placed in the jury box because such a
"practice makes it easier for those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate"); Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967) (rejecting state's rebuttal to prima facie showing of discrimina-
tion in jury venire when the designation "(c)" placed opposite the names of jurors of color on the
tax digest from which the pool was selected presented "the opportunity for discrimination"). See
also Daniel Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1144-45 (1989)
(comparing McCleskey and Castaneda and observing that "because of the highly subjective nature
of the key person's decision [in the jury venire context], the state cannot realistically expect to use
their testimony to rebut a statistical prima facie case"); Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72
TUL. L. REv. 1065, 1151 (1998) (arguing that the McCleskey Court "misconceive[d] the role of
statistical inferences from past decisions and their relationship to the challenged decision" when it
contended that petit jurors would not have an opportunity to rebut the Baldus study, since
"[s]tatistical inferences of factors influencing a decisionmaking process, taken from a pattern of
past decisions, need no rebuttal").
297. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 638 n. 10 (1982) (noting that "in the New Orleans jail
litigation, the sheriff in charge of the jail encouraged extensive news coverage of what he consid-
ered deplorable conditions in order to 'pressure the city into making improvements"').
298. David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institu-
tional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1015, 1038 (2004) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (affirming a complex remedial order in the school district context),
and Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700 (1978) (affirming a complex remedial order in the prison
context); quoting Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109, 1158 (1969)
("[Flederal and state courts insofar as their ordinary jurisdiction and remedial authority are ade-
quate to the occasion, are obliged to afford such remedies as are determined, ultimately by the
Supreme Court, to be appropriate in implementation of the Constitution."); and noting that the
Supreme Court has emphasized that "breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies,"
such as those contained in structural reform injunctions). See also State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780,
791 (La. 1993) (affirming the court's own "inherent authority... 'to fashion a remedy which will
promote the orderly and expeditious administration ofjustice."' (quoting State v. Mims, 329 So. 2d
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mand for rehearing in the individual case or possibly the release of the individual
claimant from detention. 29 9  The broadest, which would likely be realized
through an "offensive" process such as a motion for injunctive relief, would be
an order barring the juvenile court from utilizing the detention classification
process altogether until it demonstrated that it had taken steps to reduce its dis-
criminatory impact, and perhaps compelling the court to employ proven alterna-
tives to detention in the interim.30 0  While the latter would provide the surest
path toward broad systemic reform, 301 it might, for the reasons articulated above,
give appellate courts pause. Other, less sweeping remedies, which could be im-
posed in the context of the delinquency case itself or a separate civil proceeding,
include more narrowly tailored orders compelling the juvenile court to, for ex-
ample, produce additional discovery regarding its detention policies and/or data
regarding the presence of DMC at other decision points,30 2 apply a rebuttable
presumption to all future claims that the juvenile court's detention procedures
are constitutionally infirm until the court can present evidence that it has imple-
mented reformative measures, 30 3 or implement one of the myriad DMC reduc-
tion strategies that have already proven effective in other jurisdictions. 304
686, 688 (La. 1976)).
299. See, e.g., R.G. v. State, 817 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (ordering release of
juvenile from detention where no risk assessment was prepared by the Department of Juvenile
Justice as required by statute). See also Fletcher, supra note 297, at 650 ("At the conceptual level
habeas corpus is the easiest remedy, for it relieves the judge of the need to resolve any non-legal
polycentric remedial problems beyond the bare resolution inherent in the release of the prison-
ers.").
300. See, e.g., Finney v. Ark. Bd. of Corr., 505 F.2d 194, 202 (8th Cir. 1974) (enjoining state
prison officials from utilizing procedure to transfer juveniles from reformatory to state prison until
constitutional infirmities within the state prison were removed).
301. Note, Constitutional Risks to Equal Protection in the Criminal Justice System, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2098, 2115 (2001) ("If the goal is systemic change, then structural injunctions
seemingly provide a ready answer."); Meltzer, supra note 279, at 325 (arguing that offensive suits
for remedies "would be likely to contain a much fuller record of the scope and nature of govern-
ment violations, and the remedial order would be framed under a familiar process that helps to
structure and resolve the question of appropriate relief').
302. Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution, 34 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1071, 1090-98 (1997) (arguing for compelled discovery as a form of"soft enforcement" in
selective prosecution cases).
303. See Peart, 621 So. 2d at 791 (remanding case for retrial of defendant's motion for inef-
fective assistance of counsel and instructing lower court to, among other things, "hold individual
hearings for each such moving defendant and, in the absence of significant improvement in the
provision of indigent defense services to defendants . . . to apply a rebuttable presumption that
such indigents are not receiving assistance of counsel effective enough to meet constitutionally
required standards").
304. For descriptions of strategies, programs, and methods which have proven effective in
reducing DMC, see, for example, No TURNING BACK, supra note 189 (documenting success stories
in reducing DMC and providing strategies, ideas, and models for advocates, community organiza-
tions, public officials, and others addressing DMC); ASHLEY M. NELLIS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, SEVEN STEPS TO DEVELOP AND
EVALUATE STRATEGIES TO REDUCE DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT (DMC) (2005) (help-
ing program administrators and juvenile justice personnel select the most effective ways to reduce
DMC through performance measurement and evaluation); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
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Ultimately, whether through a structural injunction, a narrowly tailored decree,
or individualized relief in a single case, a successful claim would likely create
incentives for local actors or state legislatures to take responsibility for fashion-
ing and implementing their own reformative measures.
CONCLUSION
On April 27, 2003, Jason was committed to the Massachusetts Department
of Youth Services. He spent the next four months in a secure placement facility
forty-five minutes outside of Boston. While he was eventually able to return to a
foster home in Boston, he remained under DYS supervision until his eighteenth
birthday. As a consequence of his commitment, Jason had difficulty re-enrolling
in school and getting a job. Even more significant to Jason, however, was the
stigma associated with being labeled a 'juvenile delinquent." In the span ofjust
six months, he had gone from "victim" to "offender" in the eyes of the law-a
migration that impacted not only the community's opinion of him, but, in more
subtle respects, his view of himself
Admittedly, without evidence of overt race bias, it is impossible to deter-
mine "to a moral certainty" 30 5 that Jason's race directly influenced the outcome
of his individual case. What is clear, however, is that there was ample opportu-
nity for race to infect the decision-making process. From the police officer who
arrested and charged Jason largely on the basis of geographical association; to
the probation officer who readily attributed Jason's behavior to internal deficien-
cies rather than external neglect; to the judge who, on the basis of a five-minute
appearance, concluded that Jason was an adolescent in need of state "supervi-
sion"; to the lawyers who failed to learn enough about Jason to effectively neu-
tralize the predilections of the others, it is plain that the individuals whose
cumulative actions and inactions ultimately led to Jason's commitment were
constrained by neither their colleagues, the public, nor their own procedures.
Compounding the potential for race to impact their decisions, either consciously
or unconsciously, was the fact that these decision-makers were also required by
Massachusetts law to consider factors beyond just the offense for which Jason
was charged-factors which, in most cases, were rooted in fleeting and impres-
sionistic assessments of Jason's socio-familial stability.
What is also clear is that race likely did infect the decision-making process
in the Suffolk County juvenile justice system in 2002. In the year that Jason
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, MATHEMATICS OF RISK CLASSIFICATION:
CHANGING DATA INTO VALID INSTRUMENTS FOR JUVENILE COURTS (2005) (assisting juvenile courts
in developing and using risk classification instruments and offering recommendations for selecting
classification procedures).
305. In McCleskey, Professor Baldus offered the following testimony: "In [a multi-
regression] analysis of this type, obviously one cannot say that we can say to a moral certainty
what it was that influenced the decision." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.29 (1987).
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entered the system, youth of color made up 70% of the juvenile population in
Suffolk County, Massachusetts, but they represented 91% of the youth held in
secure detention facilities, 84% of the youth placed on supervised probation,
93% of the youth committed to the Department of Youth Services, and 95% of
the youth committed to "hardware secure" DYS facilities in the county. 30 6
Whether this evidence-that the decision-making process utilized by the Boston
Juvenile Court in Jason's case was susceptible of abuse and that youth of color
were disproportionally detained by the court during the period in question-is
proof of discrimination is debatable. What this article suggests, however, is that
this evidence should be enough to create an inference of discrimination, and that
the ensuing debate is one which should, and, in many respects, must, be held by
the courts.
If successful, an equal protection challenge to the disproportionate pretrial
detention of juveniles of color has the potential to yield benefits far beyond the
mandate in any individual case. 30 7 Attempts to reform the system through the
carrot of federal funds contingent on good-faith efforts by state and local actors
to analyze and repair their own systems have been disappointing at best, and in
some cases outright failures. The threat of losing federal funding, which is the
only potential sanction for maintaining systems that produce unacceptable out-
comes, has simply not been potent enough in many jurisdictions to motivate the
actors who matter to police themselves. The virtue of attacking the problem
through an equal protection challenge is that it would, at the very least, require
those actors to step forward and unpack their decisions. At best, it would force
them to do much more than that. Finally, from an institutional perspective, a
successful challenge would place the responsibility for reforming the system
where it belongs, on those who administer it, and would give courts the opportu-
nity to step forward and repair the damage done to their legitimacy by decades of
Disproportionate Minority Contact.
306. Juvenile Defense Network: DMC Stats, http://www.youthadvocacyproject.org/DMC/
suffolk.htm. These statistics were obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive
Office of Public Safety by the Juvenile Defense Network, a project of the Committee for Public
Counsel Services in Massachusetts.
307. Obviously, the efficacy of such a challenge in an individual case depends on the facts of
that case, the levels of disproportionality reflected in the applicable studies, the legal status of the
juvenile claimant, and, most importantly, the willingness of the claimant to engage in what could
well become a protracted and public fight.
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